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Summary
Overall summary
The Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) study is a large-scale randomised evaluation 
that was run in six UK regions between October 2003 and October 2007 to test the effectiveness of 
an innovative package of support for individuals starting the New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+) or the New 
Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) programmes. 
The aim of this report is to explore how the four-year findings from the experimental research relate 
to the impacts that would have been experienced, on average, by all the people who were eligible 
for ERA, had they participated in the programme. (Please note that a full ERA evaluation report 
looking at the five-year impacts, as well as at the costs and benefits associated with the programme 
will be published by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) during spring 2011.)
Overall, the findings either validate the four-year interim experimental results of the main ERA 
evaluation or indicate that the ERA intervention would have been even more effective for its full 
eligible population than it was for its actual participants. Specifically, for the ND25+ group the 
experimental impacts on earnings appear to be representative of the impacts that the full eligible 
ND25+ population would have experienced under ERA. The experimental findings on employment 
are, however, found to actually underestimate, by over one-third, the gains that the ND25+ eligible 
population would have enjoyed under ERA. 
A similar story emerged for the NDLP group, but in terms of different outcomes. The NDLP eligible 
population would have experienced the same (zero) impact as the participants in terms of 
employment. However, the eligible population would have experienced a significant and positive 
increase in earnings instead of the absence of any significant impact as experienced by the study 
participants.
Background
Carefully planned and administered randomised experiments arguably offer the most reliable 
method for evaluating whether a programme works, on average, for its participants. Since eligible 
individuals are allocated randomly between a programme group receiving the services and a control 
group not receiving them, any systematic difference between the two groups in later outcomes 
can safely be attributed to the programme. Such an experimental approach is currently being 
used to assess the effectiveness of ERA, a programme which was operational in six Jobcentre Plus 
districts across the UK between October 2003 and October 2007. Eligible for this new set of support 
and financial incentives to secure, retain and progress in work were those who were mandated to 
participate in the ND25+ programme and those who had volunteered for the NDLP programme.1 
With over 16,000 individuals being randomly assigned over one year, the ERA study represented 
at its inception the largest randomised evaluation of a social programme in Great Britain (see e.g. 
Dorsett et al., 2007, for additional background on ERA).
1 This analysis focuses on the two main ERA target groups, representing 83 per cent of all ERA 
study participants. The third group – lone parents working part-time and in receipt of Working 
Tax Credit (WTC) who had volunteered for ERA – is not considered in this report due to its 
conceptually different set-up coupled with lack of data.
2 Summary
The issue
All individuals flowing into ND25+ and NDLP in the six evaluation districts during the one-year intake 
window should automatically have become eligible for the package of support offered by ERA. It 
has, however, emerged that not all of them actually entered the evaluation sample: some people 
who were eligible actively refused to be randomly assigned and to take part in the experimental 
evaluation (the ‘formal refusers’), while some eligible individuals were somehow not offered the 
possibility to participate in random assignment and hence in ERA (the ‘diverted customers’). A 
sizeable fraction of the eligible population – 23 per cent of ND25+ and 30 per cent of NDLP – were 
thus not represented in the experiment.
Research objectives
After setting the foundation work for the analysis of non-participation in the ERA study, this report 
employs an array of non-experimental methods to inform the policymaker on the impact that the 
full ERA eligible population would have been likely to experience had they been offered the chance 
to participate in ERA. The report thus aims to:
•	 explain	the	subtle	issues	that	non-participation	raises	for	the	ERA	demonstration;
•	 introduce	the	different	approaches	and	methodologies	to	deal	with	it;
•	 present	the	findings	four	years	after	entering	the	New	Deal	programme;	and
•	 discuss	emerging	lessons.
Specifically, the report aims to answer the following research questions:
•	 What	kind	of	impact	would	the	non-participants	have	experienced,	on	average,	had	they	been	
offered ERA services and incentives?
•	 What	would	the	impact	of	the	ERA	study	have	been	on	its	full	intended	population?	
•	 How	does	this	estimated	impact	for	the	full	eligible	population	compare	to	the	experimental	
impact estimate obtained for the ERA study participants? 
•	 The	report	also	sheds	light	on	the	issue	of	whether	the	non-participants	are	individuals	who	
even if offered ERA services would not take them up. In other words, what type of involvement 
would the non-participants have had with ERA and more generally with Jobcentre Plus had they 
participated in the study?
Issues posed by non-participation for the experimental analysis
The policymaker would arguably be interested in assessing the impact of offering ERA services and 
incentives for all those eligible to receive such an offer. The experimental evaluation on the other 
hand provides, under suitable assumptions, unbiased impact estimates only for the ERA study 
participants – those eligible individuals who have reached the randomisation stage and have agreed 
to participate in the experimental evaluation. The concern is that this subgroup may potentially 
be a selective one. This report, therefore, focuses on the full eligible population in the ERA districts 
over the study intake window and on the causal effect for the eligible population of making the 
ERA package available. This average effect of the ERA offer for all those eligible for ERA in the six 
districts is the same type of parameter recovered by the experimental study (the effect of offering 
ERA in the six districts), but it is averaged over all eligible individuals, rather than over a potentially 
adviser-selected and self-selected subgroup of the eligible population. 
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A related way to appreciate the importance of this group and hence, the meaning of this parameter, 
as well as to envisage more fully how ERA as an official policy could work is to think of ERA as an 
integral component of the New Deal programme, specifically as a seamless next stage in which 
any New Deal participant would automatically be enrolled upon having found work.2 A scenario in 
which all NDLP and ND25+ entrants are automatically ‘opted in’ for ERA gives direct and high policy 
relevance to the full NDLP and ND25+ samples, the focus of this report.
The report assesses whether an overall non-participation rate of 26.6 per cent is likely to have 
affected the extent to which the experimental results can be generalised to the full eligible 
population, and hence, their representativeness and policy relevance.3
Had the level of non-participation been low, this would be of less interest. It is the fact that non-
participation is around a quarter of all those eligible that opens up at least the theoretical possibility 
that the experimental impacts are biased for the impact that the full eligible population would have 
experienced.
The ERA study offers the rare chance to look at this issue because: (1) the treatment is the offer of 
ERA	support	and	incentives;	(2)	the	whole	population	of	ND25+	and	NDLP	entrants	in	the	six	districts	
was	eligible	for	this	offer	(and	would	be	eligible	under	an	official	policy);	and	(3)	such	entrants	are	
identified in the available administrative data.
Types of non-experimental analyses
This study performs different types of non-experimental analyses seeking to recover the potential 
impact of ERA on the full eligible population (in the six districts) and compares it to the experimental 
impact estimate for the ERA study participants. In most cases, identifying and estimating the 
average impact on the eligible population first requires identifying and estimating the average 
impact that the non-participants would have experienced had they been offered ERA and agreed to 
participate in the study.
The analyses are performed under alternative assumptions on the participation process:
•	 bounding	the	impacts	of	interest	without	making	any	assumption	on	the	selection	process;
•	 impact	estimates	under	the	assumption	that	the	analyst	observes	all	outcome-relevant	
characteristics	that	drive	selection	into	the	ERA	study	(‘matching	approach’);	and
•	 impact	estimates	that	allow	selection	into	the	ERA	study	to	depend	on	unobservable	factors	
(‘control function approach’).
The specific nature of the set-up and data – randomisation coupled with administrative outcome 
data for the non-participants – allows one to perform a number of tests not generally available. 
Specifically,	one	can	test	for	the	presence	of	residual	selection	on	some	type	of	unobservable;	one	
can	test,	to	some	extent,	the	validity	of	the	instrument	needed	for	the	control	function	model;	and	
one can test two other features of the performance of the control function model.
2 An eligible worker could of course always opt out of ERA – both formally if there were 
such a proviso and de facto as they could not be forced (or sanctioned) into taking up the  
ERA package.
3 Technically, this relates to the extent to external validity of the experimental findings, or 
equivalently, to the scope for non-participation bias in the experimental estimate in terms of 
the impact on the whole eligible population.
4Based on extensive diagnostic and specification tests, as well as on contrasting and cross-checking 
the findings and evidence from the different methodological approaches, the picture that emerges 
based on the most robust results is summarised in the following key findings.
Key findings
The analyses in this report have considered the impact that the full population eligible for ERA would 
have experienced had they been offered the chance to participate in ERA and how this relates to the 
experimental impact found for the study participants. The story that emerged, summarised in Table 
1, differs for the ND25+ and NDLP groups and across outcomes.
Table 1 Summary results of non-participation analysis for main ERA impacts, 
 allowing for selection on observed characteristics 
Based on ERA study  
participants only
After allowing for effects  
of non-participation
ND25+ group
Ever employed **  +2.8**ppts  +3.7*** ppts
Days in employment  +25**days  +34*** days
Earnings 2005–09  +£1,805**  +£1,940***
NDLP group
Ever employed  -0.8 ppts  0.0 ppts
Days in employment  -4 days  +3 days
Earnings 2005–09 *  +£767  +£1,262**
Notes: Significance * at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level.
Rows marked with asterisks denote a result allowing for non-participation which is significantly different from 
the experimental one based on participants only.
The second column of Table 1 presents key findings from the experimental research four years after 
programme start.4 No impact could be detected on the employment and earnings outcomes of the 
NDLP programme group compared to the control group. By contrast, ND25+ study participants were 
found to enjoy better employment outcomes (a 2.8 percentage point higher probability of being in 
work and an extra 25 days spent in employment) and higher earnings (an annual increase of £392 
and a £1,805 cumulative gain) due to ERA.
As shown in the third column, the findings from analyses in this report either validate the four-
year experimental results of the main ERA evaluation or indicate that the ERA intervention would 
have been even more effective for its full eligible population than it was for its actual participants. 
Specifically, for the ND25+ group the experimental impacts on earnings appear to be representative 
of the impacts that the full eligible ND25+ population would have experienced under ERA. The 
experimental findings on employment are however found to actually underestimate, by over one- 
third, the gains that the ND25+ eligible population would have enjoyed under ERA. 
4 A full ERA evaluation report looking at the five-year impacts, as well as at the costs and 
benefits associated with the programme will be published by DWP during spring 2011.
Summary
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ND25+ group
What the table clearly shows is that the overall ND25+ pattern of significant increases in earnings 
and	employment	is	confirmed;	both	in	terms	of	size	and	statistical	significance,	impacts	for	the	full	
population would have been stronger than for the experimental group of participants. Indeed, for 
the probability of being ever employed during the four-year follow-up the difference in impacts for 
the eligible population and for the experimental sample reaches statistical significance.
•	 If	all	those eligible to take part in the ERA study had done so, the employment effects of ERA in 
the 48 months since inflow would have been significantly higher. In other words, according to the 
best estimates derived in this report, the effect on employment outcomes from the experimental 
analysis is a significant underestimate of the impact which would have been seen if all eligible 
individuals had participated.
 This result is driven by the fact that the employment impact for the non-participants would have 
been considerably larger than the one for the participants. 
– Compared to a 2.8 percentage point increase on the probability of ever being employed over 
the four-year period found for the participants, it is estimated that the non-participants would 
have enjoyed a 6.4 percentage point increase, and all those eligible for ERA a 3.7 percentage 
point increase, with both impacts for the non-participants and for the eligibles being statistically 
significantly different from the impact enjoyed by the participants.
– Similarly, compared to an increase in employment duration over the four-year period of 25 days 
found for the experimental sample of participants, the non-participants would have enjoyed a 
63 day increase, and all those eligible for ERA a 34-day increase.
•	 By	contrast,	the	four-year	experimental	estimates	of	the	impact	for	study	participants	are	
representative of the average impact that the eligible population would have experienced in terms 
of earnings, as measured by the four tax-year earnings post inflow and by cumulative 2005–09 
tax earnings. Specifically, the point estimates for the earnings impacts for non-participants as 
well as for the full eligible population are always larger than the corresponding point estimates for 
participants, but such differences are far from reaching any statistical significance.
NDLP group
For the NDLP group, the broad pattern of no impact on employment is confirmed, but the previously 
insignificant positive impact on earnings now becomes a significant one.
•	 The	experimental impact estimates of employment outcomes in the four years post-inflow 
are found to be representative of the average impact that ERA would have had on its eligible 
population. Specifically, no significant impact was found for the experimental sample on either 
employment duration or the probability of ever being employed during the four-year follow-up 
period, and the absence of any significant impact extends to the non-participants, and hence, to 
the eligible population. Again, it is worth noting, however, that the point estimates for the eligible 
population and especially for the non-participants are higher and in positive territory compared to 
the (insignificant but) negative ones for participants.
•	 By	contrast,	if	all	those	eligible	for	ERA	had	taken	part	the	earnings impacts for the NDLP group 
would have been higher. In other words, excluding the non-participants from the analysis 
significantly underestimates the impact that ERA would have had on the average earnings of 
all those eligible for ERA. This is the case for earnings in the 2006/07 and 2008/09 tax years as 
well as for cumulative earnings (point estimates for the non-participants are strongly significant 
and larger than the ones for participants in the other two fiscal years as well). Specifically, while 
ERA has not significantly increased participants’ cumulative earnings over the follow-up period 
(an insignificant £767 point estimate), non-participants would have enjoyed a highly significant 
£2,393 rise in cumulative earnings and the eligible population a significant £1,262 rise. 
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In conclusion, for both New Deal groups and in terms of all outcomes considered, non-participants 
would have enjoyed uniformly higher ERA impacts than do participants. Only for ND25+ employment 
and NDLP earnings outcomes do such differences reach statistical significance and indeed extend to 
significant differences between impacts for study participants and impacts for the full eligible ERA 
population. 
Finally, the report has assessed the conjecture that if ERA became an official policy, non-participants 
would be mostly uninterested in taking up its support and incentives anyway. Exploiting first-year 
follow-up data on participants’ involvement with Jobcentre Plus, the analyses have found no support 
for this hypothesis for either intake group. In fact, the results show that overall, the non-participants 
display observed characteristics that make them quite likely to be involved with ERA and with 
Jobcentre Plus more generally. Specifically, had they been randomised into the programme, the 
non-participants would have been less aware of ERA or less involved with Jobcentre Plus than 
the programme group was in the first year only in terms of a couple of measures, and then only 
marginally so. Indeed, had they become eligible for ERA services and incentives, the NDLP non-
participants would have been over three percentage points more likely than the programme group 
to be involved in training or education activities arranged by Jobcentre Plus within their first year, as 
well as more likely to be directed to a Jobclub or Programme Centre. Had they been randomised into 
the control group, NDLP non-participants would have been four percentage points more likely than 
the actual control group to rate advice from Jobcentre Plus staff as very helpful in the first year. 
Conclusions and lessons learnt 
The picture that emerged from the interim four-year experimental findings is that ERA has not been 
effective in improving the employment and earnings outcomes of NDLP participants in the four-year 
follow-up period, but that the intervention has significantly improved both types of outcomes for 
ND25+ participants.
How has the presence of the non-participants affected the representativeness (or external validity) 
of such experimental impact estimates?
Overall, the representativeness of the four-year experimental impact estimates was found to 
depend on the intake group and outcomes considered. As a result, it was found that the four-
year experimental findings either do not change or provide an overly conservative picture of the 
effectiveness that ERA would have had on its full eligible population. Specifically: 
•	 For	ND25+	earnings	and	NDLP	employment	the	four-year	experimental	results	appear	to	
generalise to the full eligible population, leaving the story unchanged. In particular, the four-year 
experimental findings show that ERA had no effect on NDLP employment, while it has significantly 
and substantially increased ND25+ earnings. This report shows that what the programme has 
done for the participants in these dimensions, it would also have done for the non-participants 
and hence, for the full eligible population.
•	 By contrast, the representativeness of the ERA study is lower in terms of ND25+ employment and 
NDLP earnings, with the four-year experimental impact findings underestimating the gains that all 
eligible individuals would have enjoyed had they been offered ERA services and incentives. These 
analyses thus do find evidence of non-participation bias (or of some loss in external validity) in the 
ERA study. For the ND25+ group, the employment impact estimates that rely on experimental data 
alone (+2.8ppt probability and +25 days) underestimate the likely impact that ERA would have had 
on all ND25+ entrants (+3.7ppt probability and +34 days). For the NDLP group, it is the earnings 
experimental impact estimates (no significant increase) that underestimate the likely impact that 
ERA would have had on all NDLP entrants (+£1,262 cumulatively).
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Of course, there is always the issue of how different the estimates for the eligible population and 
for the experimental sample need to be for one to view the issue as a particularly important one. 
Randomised experiments are, however, conceptually designed to provide, with accuracy, the 
‘true’ answer to the evaluation question. Hence, an effect for the eligible group which is over one-
third larger than the experimental estimate or indeed a large, significant impact for the eligible 
population that surfaces when none was found experimentally can be viewed as findings of 
substance.
8 Background, research questions and overview
1 Background, research 
 questions and overview
1.1 Background
Carefully planned and administered randomised social experiments arguably represent the most 
reliable method for evaluating whether a programme works, on average, for its participants. Since 
eligible individuals are allocated randomly between a programme group receiving the services and a 
control group not receiving them, under reasonable assumptions any systematic difference in later 
outcomes observed between the two groups can be attributed to the programme. 
While experimental studies have played an important role in the design of US welfare and training 
programmes, they have not been widely used in the UK. A recent exception is the Employment 
Retention and Advancement (ERA) demonstration, which ran in six Jobcentre Plus districts across 
the Great Britain between October 2003 and October 2007. Eligible for this new set of support 
and financial incentives to secure, retain and progress in work were those who were mandated 
to participate in New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+) and those who had volunteered for New Deal for Lone 
Parents (NDLP).5 With over 16,000 individuals being randomly assigned in six districts over one 
year, the ERA study represented at its inception the largest randomised, controlled trial of a social 
programme in the UK (see, for example, Dorsett et al., 2007, for additional background on ERA).
Since ERA offered of a package of support once in work6, all individuals flowing into ND25+ and 
NDLP in the six evaluation districts during the one-year intake window should automatically have 
become eligible to be offered the ERA package. It has, however, emerged that not all of them have 
entered the evaluation sample: some eligible individuals actively refused to be randomly assigned 
and to take part in the experimental evaluation (the ‘formal refusers’), while some were somehow 
not offered the possibility to participate in random assignment and hence, in ERA (the ‘diverted 
customers’). A sizeable fraction of the eligible population – 23 per cent of ND25+ and 30 per cent of 
NDLP7 – was thus not represented in the experiment.8
5 This analysis focuses on the two main ERA target groups, representing 83 per cent of all ERA 
study participants. The third group – lone parents working part-time and in receipt of Working 
Tax Credit (WTC) who have volunteered for ERA – is not considered in this report due to its 
conceptually different set-up coupled with lack of data. See Section 2.4 for a more extended 
discussion.
6 Eligible individuals have access to in-work emergency payments to overcome short-term 
barriers to staying in work, those working are further entitled to employment-related 
assistance from an Advancement Support Adviser (ASA) and qualify for a training bonus and, 
provided they work for at least 30 hours a week, for a work retention bonus as well.
7 The composition of the non-participants varied markedly between the two intake groups, as 
the bulk of non-participation in the ND25+ group was thus due to formal refusals, while in the 
NDLP group by diverted customers. Specifically, nine per cent of all ND25+ eligibles appear to 
have been diverted and 14 per cent formally refused. By contrast, over one quarter (26.4 per 
cent) of all eligible NDLP entrants in the six districts appear to have been diverted, while only 
four per cent formally refused. 
8	 Goodman	and	Sianesi	(2007)	have	explored	diversion/refusal	in	detail;	some	of	their	main	
conclusions and findings are summarised in Chapter 2.
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1.2 Research questions
The key objective of the report is to quantify the impact that the full ERA eligible New Deal 
population would have been likely to experience in the four years since inflow into the New Deal had 
they been offered the chance to participate in ERA, and to assess how this impact for the full eligible 
group relates to the experimental impact estimated on the subgroup of study participants.9
To achieve this aim, the report first sets out the foundation work for the analysis of non-participation 
in the ERA study not only by introducing the different approaches and methodologies to deal with 
non-participation, but also by explaining the various and subtle issues that it raises for the ERA 
demonstration. 
So what kind of issues does non-participation pose for the experimental analysis?
The policymaker would arguably be interested in assessing the average impact of offering ERA 
services and incentives for all those eligible to receive such an offer. The experimental evaluation 
on the other hand provides, under suitable assumptions, unbiased impact estimates only for the 
ERA study participants – those who reached the randomisation stage and agreed to participate 
in the demonstration. The concern is that this subgroup may potentially be a selective one, not 
representative of the full eligible population in the ERA districts who would have been eligible for 
ERA had it been an official national policy. This report, by contrast, directly focuses on the full eligible 
population and on the causal effect for them of making the ERA package available. This average 
effect of the offer of ERA for all those eligible for ERA in the six districts over the study intake 
window is the same type of parameter recovered by the experimental study (the effect of offering 
ERA in the six districts), but averaged over all the full eligible group, rather than over a potentially 
adviser-selected and self-selected subgroup of the eligible population. 
A related way to appreciate the importance of this group and hence, the meaning of this parameter, 
as well as to envisage more fully how ERA as a normal policy could work is to think of ERA as an 
integral, seamless component of the New Deal programme in which any New Deal participant would 
automatically be enrolled upon entering work.10 A scenario in which all NDLP and ND25+ entrants 
are automatically ‘opted in’ for ERA gives direct and high policy relevance to the full NDLP and 
ND25+ samples, the focus of this report.
The non-participation problem raises the question of the extent to which the conclusions from the 
experimental study would hold for the whole eligible population. Technically, this is the issue of 
‘external validity’ of the experimental impact estimates: how legitimate would it be to generalise 
these results to the full eligible population?11
The beauty of the ERA study is that it offers the rare chance to actually measure the loss in external 
validity.	This	is	because:	(1)	the	treatment	is	the	offer	of	ERA	support	and	incentives;	(2)	the	whole	
population of ND25+ and NDLP entrants in the six districts was eligible for this offer (and would be 
eligible	under	an	official	policy);	and	(3)	such	entrants	are	identified	in	the	available	administrative	data.
9 Throughout the report, ‘participants’ refers to everyone who entered the randomisation 
process, i.e. it includes those receiving ERA services and the control group.
10 An eligible worker could of course always opt out of ERA – both formally if there were such 
a proviso and de facto as they could not be forced (or sanctioned) into taking up the 
ERA package.
11 Alternatively, non-participation can be viewed as introducing potential bias in the experimental 
estimate if interest lies in the impact of ERA on the eligible population (in the six districts).
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A previous descriptive report (Goodman and Sianesi, 2007) has explored how representative the 
group is for whom one can calculate experimental estimates by understanding both how large and 
how selective the group of non-participants is. Overall, the non-participation problem seems to be a 
relevant one. 
The general aim of this report is thus to build on these descriptive findings to assess whether an 
overall non-participation rate of 26.6 per cent is likely to have affected the extent to which the 
four-year experimental results can be generalised to the full eligible population, and hence, their 
representativeness and policy relevance. Had the level of non-participation been low, this would be 
of less interest. It is the fact that non-participation is around a quarter of all those eligible that opens 
up at least the theoretical possibility that the experimental impacts are biased for the impact that 
the full eligible population would have experienced.
1.3 Overview 
The study performs different types of non-experimental analyses seeking to recover the impact of 
ERA on the full eligible population (in the six districts) and compares it to the four-year experimental 
impact estimates for the ERA study participants. In most cases, identifying and estimating the 
average impact on the eligible population requires first identifying and estimating the average ERA 
impact that the non-participants would have experienced. These analyses are performed under 
alternative assumptions on the participation process.
The report starts by considering analyses that provide bounds for the impact of interest without any 
assumption on the selection process. 
Next, impact estimates are provided under the assumption that one can observe all outcome-
relevant characteristics that drive selection into the ERA study. Characteristics that are observed in 
the data include an individual’s demographics as well as information on their current unemployment 
spell, detailed labour market histories and local factors. This type of analysis is related to matching 
and reweighting techniques. Furthermore, within this framework one can estimate the type of 
involvement that the non-participants would have had with ERA and more generally with Jobcentre 
Plus in the first year had they participated in the evaluation study. This allows one to shed some 
light on the question of whether the non-participants are indeed individuals who even if offered ERA 
services would not take them up.
Finally, approaches are considered that allow for selection into the ERA study based on 
unobservables, i.e. on outcome-relevant characteristics that are not recorded in the available data. 
In addition to the standard examples of an individual’s motivation, ambition, social contacts and 
health status, the available data contains no direct information on educational attainment, which is 
thus among the most important ‘unobservables’. These types of analyses follow a so-called control 
function approach and rely on an exclusion restriction, that is, a variable that affects participation 
in the ERA study but not outcomes directly. The analysis starts with the standard sample selection 
model, but then extends it in various directions: it relaxes independence between the observed 
characteristics	and	the	unobservables;	it	relaxes	the	normality	assumption;	and	it	allows	for	
censoring in the outcome variable (both days in employment and earnings are censored at zero).
All of these models build on the standard Heckman (1979) selection model. In this set-up one is, 
however, in the rather unique position to observe the (administrative) outcomes of the selected-out 
sample – the non-participants. Coupled with randomisation, this feature of the data allows one to 
test for the presence and extent of residual selection on some type of unobservable. The study further 
exploits it to test part of the assumption needed for the validity of the instrument, as well as two other 
features of the performance of the model. Specifically, the analysis is in a position to choose between 
different specifications of the control function model based on two ‘metrics’: how well the various 
models capture the presence and direction of the residual selection that has been uncovered, and how 
well the various models predict the (no-treatment) outcome of the non-participants.
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The following gives a more detailed overview of how the remainder of the report is organised.
•	 Chapter 2 outlines how non-participation in the ERA evaluation has come about and summarises 
the available qualitative and quantitative evidence. It then briefly discusses the intake group 
excluded from this analysis (lone parents working part-time and in receipt of WTC), before 
focusing on placing the experimental and non-participation analyses into proper context.
•	 Chapter 3 briefly describes the data and the working definition of ERA eligibility. It also provides 
sample breakdowns by intake group and district and describes the rich set of variables that 
have been collated from different sources in order to capture key characteristics relating to the 
individuals themselves, their office and their local area.
•	 The	methodological	approaches	and	the	type	of	analyses	performed	in	the	report	are	presented	in	
Chapter 4. The description is kept as non-technical as its rather technical nature allows. 
– Section 4.1 starts by formally presenting the analytical framework, together with conditions 
for the experimental impact estimate to coincide with the average impact for the full eligible 
population. 
– Bounds which make no assumption on the selection process into the ERA study are discussed 
in Section 4.2. This section also sketches some sensitivity analysis to assess how robust the 
estimate of the average treatment effect for the full eligible group is to assumptions about the 
selection process. 
– Section 4.3 deals with methods relying on the selection-on-observables assumption. It starts 
by briefly relating the available data to the plausibility of this assumption. It then outlines the 
approach to estimate the impact on all eligible individuals and suggests simple sensitivity analyses 
to assess how sensitive the estimates are to straightforward violations of this crucial assumption. 
This section also outlines an analysis to assess the take-up of services and the contact with 
Jobcentre Plus staff that non-participants would have had, had they been offered ERA.
– Section 4.4 is devoted to selection on unobservables and outlines the basic ideas behind the 
‘control function method’, as well as tests on whether there are outcome-relevant unobservable 
differences between ERA study participants and non-participants and for the validity of the 
instrument needed for this type of model. Appendix A contains a more in-depth description.
•	 The	results	of	all	empirical	analyses	are	presented	and	discussed	in	Chapter 5. 
– Section 5.1 starts by presenting the four-year experimental findings concerning the average 
impact of ERA for the participants. 
– Section 5.2 reports the findings from the bounds and sensitivity analyses.
– Section 5.3 focuses on those arising from the different models based on the selection-on-
observables assumption. This section also includes the results of the analysis of take-up of ERA 
services and involvement with Jobcentre Plus. 
– Section 5.4 is devoted to presenting and discussing the tests and sensitivity checks relating to 
the different control function models.
•	 Chapter 6 summarises the key results and briefly concludes.
•	 The	appendices	provide	additional	material:	Appendix A contains a more in-depth description of 
the control function approach, as well as the full results for these models. Appendix B presents 
the results and summary boxes for the district-level analyses, while Appendices C and D contain 
intermediate diagnostic and estimation results.
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2 Non-participation in the  
 ERA study: The issues
2.1 How did non-participation come about
In an ideal scenario, all individuals in the six evaluation districts who would take part in Employment 
Retention and Advancement (ERA) if it were an official policy would have been randomly assigned 
to either the programme group or the control group. Departures from this ideal situation have arisen 
from two sources:
•	 intake	process:	not	all	eligible	individuals	may	have	been	offered	the	possibility	to	participate	in	
random	assignment	and	hence	in	ERA	(the	‘diverted	customers’);	and
•	 individual	consent:	some	individuals	who	were	offered	the	chance	to	take	part	in	the	experimental	
evaluation actively refused to do so (the ‘formal refusers’).
Taken together, diverted customers and formal refusers make up the group of the ‘ERA non-
participants’, that is those individuals who whilst being eligible for ERA, for some reason or another 
have not been included in the experimental sample and have thus not participated in the evaluation.
The ‘ERA study participants’ are the group of individuals who were eligible for ERA, were offered 
the chance to participate in the study and agreed to take part in it. These are those making up the 
evaluation sample, i.e. those who were subsequently randomly assigned either to the programme 
group, who would receive ERA services and incentives, or to the control group, who would instead 
receive the baseline New Deal treatment.
2.2 What is known about non-participation in the ERA study
2.2.1 Qualitative evidence
Qualitative work conducted as part of the ERA evaluation has shed interesting light on the origins 
and sources of non-participation. In particular, Hall et al. (2005) and Walker et al. (2006) have looked 
closely at the assignment and participation process in ERA at selected sites. Based on detailed 
observations, interviews and discussions with both staff and individuals, the authors have put 
forward the conjecture that it is quite unlikely for ERA non-participants to be a random subgroup of 
the two eligible New Deal groups. 
Recognising that two parties – the caseworker and the individual – are involved in the decision 
processes that led to inclusion in the sample of ERA study participants, the discussion of what is 
known about non-participation from this qualitative work is organised in two parts. 
Since the individual can only refuse once having been offered the chance to participate, the 
individual’s decision has direct bearing on the second choice, i.e. the one between participation and 
formal refusal. On the other hand, the caseworker can affect both types of outcomes: they basically 
have sole decision power as to who to offer ERA to, as well as considerable influence in steering the 
individual’s response to such an offer. In an individual case, it might also be lack of understanding of 
the process on the part of the adviser, or even the possibility that the New Deal starting dates (which 
qualify an individual to be offered ERA) as recorded on the system may not be as precisely perceived 
by staff.
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Ensuring that staff randomly assigned all eligible individuals
The six districts could exercise significant discretion in how they organised the ERA recruitment, 
intake and random assignment processes, so that a number of models ended up being used.12 
Although the expectation in any model was that the intake staff, be it an ERA adviser (ASA) or a 
New Deal PA, would encourage all eligible individuals – and encourage all of them equally hard – to 
consent to be randomly assigned and have a chance to participate in ERA, staff could use discretion 
on two fronts: 
•	 what	individuals	to	tell	about	ERA,	directly	determining	the	extent	of	diverted	customers;	and
•	 in	what	terms	to	present	and	market	ERA	to	individuals,	thus	affecting	the	likelihood	that	they	
would become formal refusers.
As to the latter, the abstract notion that staff would use the same level of information and 
enthusiasm in recruiting all eligible individuals was particularly hard to implement in practice.13 
Discretion in their choice of marketing strategy could take various forms, e.g.: 
•	 how	‘hard’	to	sell	ERA;
•	 what	features	of	the	programme	to	mention	–	in	particular	whether	and	in	what	terms	to	mention	
the retention bonus, or whether to selectively emphasise features (e.g. the training bonus) to 
make	ERA	more	appealing	to	the	particular	situation	of	a	given	individual;
•	 how	far	to	exploit	the	misunderstanding	that	participation	in	ERA	be	mandatory.
But why and under what circumstances would caseworkers want to apply such discretion?
There could have been situations where the adviser did not deem that the individual would be 
interested in taking advantage of ERA or would benefit from it. 
Furthermore, the Jobcentre Plus target structure gave advisers individual-level targets for how many 
people they moved into work and accordingly rewarded staff for job entries. This incentive structure 
seems to have led advisers conducting the intake process to use their own discretion in deciding 
what individuals to sell random assignment to or how hard to sell it in order to ‘hang onto’ those 
who they perceived as clearly likely to move into work quickly. The discussion in Walker et al. (2006) 
highlights how job entry targets had an asymmetric influence on incentives of New Deal and of ERA 
12 The model closest to the original plan saw ERA intake and random assignment being 
undertaken by a specifically allocated intake adviser, who had no vested interest in its 
outcome. In other districts, it was the New Deal Personal Advisers (PAs) who conducted the 
intake and randomisation, with the ERA advisers (Advancement Support Advisers (ASAs)), 
being responsible for working with ERA programme group members only after random 
assignment had taken place. In yet other districts, the ASAs were also responsible, alongside 
the New Deal PAs, for conducting intake interviews and randomisation. Typically, ASAs in 
these districts handed over to the New Deal advisers those individuals allocated to the control 
group and those who had refused to participate in ERA. These models did not necessarily 
apply at the district level, since within a particular district, different offices and staff members 
sometimes used somewhat different procedures. Furthermore, the intake and randomisation 
procedures varied over time, in the light of experience and depending on the situation and 
needs of the district or even a single office.
13 In addition to discretionary choices about how much information to disclose, it also became 
apparent that probably owing to their greater knowledge of and enthusiasm for ERA, ASAs 
tended to give clearer explanations of ERA than PAs (Walker et al., 2006, Appendix F).
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advisers: where the intake was conducted by New Deal advisers, job-ready individuals would be 
more	likely	to	be	diverted	from	ERA;	where	ERA	advisers	were	doing	the	intake,	they	would	be	less	
likely to be diverted.14
It is thus known from this research that ERA non-participants, and especially diverted customers, are 
not	likely	to	be	random	subgroups	of	the	eligible	population;	rather,	these	are	people	whom	advisers	
had a vested interest in not subjecting to ERA.
How willing were individuals to be randomly assigned? 
Individuals who were given the option to participate in random assignment could formally refuse 
the offer, and thus be excluded from the experimental sample of ERA study participants.
A data-driven qualification to the statement that the individual can only formally refuse relates 
to the fact that individuals cannot be forced to fill in the Basic Information Form (BIF) in order to 
continue onto the New Deal programmes. Hence, an adviser might have actively offered ERA to 
an individual, but if the person was not interested for whatever reason and refused without filling 
the BIF, this person would appear in the data as a ‘diverted customer’ while in fact being a formal 
refuser. Although no quantitative or qualitative evidence is available on how frequently such a 
situation has occurred, it is thus worth keeping in mind that, strictly speaking, the individuals 
themselves might have partly contributed to determining the extent of ‘diversion’. 
What is clear from the qualitative work is that recruitment to ERA greatly differed between the 
two New Deal groups. While lone parents on New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) were all volunteers 
to that programme and thus, mostly responded favourably to ERA too, New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+) 
participants were more difficult to recruit. The reasons for formal refusal that were identified were:
•	 being	puzzled	by	how	the	additional	offer	of	ERA	fitted	in	the	mandatory	participation	in	ND25+;	
•	 having	been	unemployed	for	long	periods	of	time	and	thus	finding	it	difficult	to	envisage	what	
might happen after they obtained a job, an outcome that they and their advisers thought rather 
unlikely	anyway;	
•	 feeling	close	to	getting	a	job	in	the	near	future	and	not	wanting	to	stay	in	touch	with	 
Jobcentre Plus.
14 ‘Overall, when New Deal Personal Advisers undertook the interviewing, they had reason to 
encourage people with poor job prospects to join ERA (because in many cases they would move on 
to ASAs and off their caseloads) and those with good prospects to refuse (because they would keep 
them on their caseloads and get credit for a placement). When ASAs were involved in conducting 
intake interviews, they could have benefited from encouraging customers with poor employment 
prospects to refuse ERA and people with good prospects to join.’ (Walker et al., 2006, p.26). 
The study concludes on this issue that: ‘While [this] incentive structure was real and widely 
recognised, it is impossible to assess with any degree of precision how strong an effect it had 
on marketing strategies (and, thus, on the resulting make-up of the groups of customers who 
ended up being randomly assigned).’ (p.27).
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It thus appears that the group of formal refusers, and in particular those amongst the more 
problematic ND25+ group, might be far from random, and instead selected on (predicted) non-ERA 
outcomes.15
Furthermore, some staff identified specific attitudes and traits as good predictors that individuals, 
particularly among those mandated to start ND25+, would decline participation:
•	 a	strong	antipathy	to	government,	feeling	alienated	from	systems	of	support	and	governance;
•	 being	resistant	to	change	or	taking	risks,	‘preferring	to	stick	with	what	they	know’;
•	 reacting	against	the	labour	market,	enjoying	being	able	to	refuse	to	do	something	in	the	context	
of a mandatory programme.
A further possible reason for refusal is being engaged in benefit fraud.
Overall, the available qualitative evidence on refusals suggests that those who declined to join may, 
in fact, differ in important respects from those who agreed to participate. Formal refusers, especially 
those amongst the more problematic ND25+ group, appeared to have weaker job prospects and 
poorer attitudes than the average New Deal entrant.
In addition, the refusal rate was observed to fall later on during random assignment, likely due to 
a combination of enhanced adviser experience at selling ERA and the permission to mention the 
monetary incentives. The refusal process is, thus, likely to have changed over the intake window, 
with refusers in later entry cohorts presumably forming quite a selective group.
Finally, as mentioned above, the incentive structure arising from Jobcentre Plus job entry targets 
had an asymmetric influence on New Deal and on ERA advisers in terms of how hard to sell ERA. 
Specifically, when New Deal advisers undertook the intake interviews, they could benefit if job-ready 
individuals refused to participate in ERA and those with bad prospects consented. Conversely, when 
ERA advisers were leading the intake process, they could benefit if individuals with bad job prospects 
formally refused to participate, while those with good prospects agreed to participate.
2.2.2 A quantitative description and assessment of non-participation 
While the insights provided by these in-depth case studies were based on only very few observations 
and thus could not be safely generalised, Goodman and Sianesi (2007) take the important initial 
step to thoroughly explore how representative (or policy relevant) the group is for whom one can 
calculate experimental estimates by understanding both how large and how selective the non-
participating groups are. They perform a number of empirical analyses to assess the incidence 
and determinants of the ERA offer and acceptance. This work, thus, sheds further light on the 
implementation of random assignment in the ERA study and most important to the current report, 
on the nature and extent of the non-participation problem. Separately for the ND25+ and NDLP 
intake groups, they consider the extent to which non-participation was due to diversion and to 
formal refusal and how the incidence of non-participation has varied across district, Jobcentre 
Plus office and time. They subsequently formally assess whether eligible individuals who did not 
participate in the ERA study were different from those who did participate. To this end, they test 
15 Traditionally, the default assumption for a voluntary programme is that those who select into 
the programme are those most likely to gain from it. So in the ERA case, the exclusion of the 
formal refusers might be expected to bias the impacts upward. This, however, assumes that 
individuals can reliably predict not only their non-ERA outcomes but also their outcomes under 
ERA, which in the case of ERA appears particularly problematic given the limited information 
potential participants were given about the programme.
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for significant differences in a wide range of observable individual, office and local area-level 
characteristics, as well as for differences in post-inflow labour market outcomes.
The incidence, composition, determinants and selectivity of non-participation were markedly 
different between the ND25+ and NDLP intake groups, as well as across districts. As to incidence, 
non-participation overall was lower amongst the ND25+ group (23 per cent of the eligible group) 
than amongst NDLP entrants (over 30 per cent). In terms of composition, nine per cent of all ND25+ 
eligibles appear to have been diverted and 14% formally refused. By contrast, over one quarter (26.4 
per cent) of all eligible NDLP entrants in the six districts appear to have been diverted, while only four 
per cent formally refused. The bulk of non-participation in the ND25+ group was thus due to formal 
refusals (59 per cent), while in the NDLP group by diverted customers (86 per cent). 
There was marked variation in the incidence of non-participation according to ERA district, with 
some clear outliers in terms of performance. The lowest proportions of non-participants for both 
intake groups were observed in Scotland and in North West England, the highest in the East Midlands 
and in North East England. In particular, in the East Midlands district almost half of all eligible NDLP 
entrants did not take part in ERA, most of them diverted customers. Focusing on the ND25+ group, 
the performance of Scotland and North West England is particularly remarkable, with not one single 
diverted customer, while North East England stands out with over one-quarter of eligible ND25+ 
participants formally refusing to give their consent to being randomly assigned. A very strong and 
interesting role of Jobcentre Plus office affiliation was also uncovered in determining both ERA offer 
and consenting choice, though as expected it was stronger in the former. Over time, a fall in the 
formal refusal rate was observed for both intake groups, likely to reflect increased adviser experience 
and confidence in selling ERA, as well as the permission to mention ERA financial incentives.
Non-participants were found to differ from participants in some important respects. Most of the 
explained variation in ERA offer, acceptance and participation is accounted for by an individual’s 
district, office affiliation and inflow month, underscoring the key role played by local practices and 
constraints. Individual employment prospects, as well as attitudes towards and past participation 
in government programmes were however also found to matter, leaving only a residual role to 
demographic characteristics.
In the absence of non-participation bias, the control group and the non-participants should 
behave similarly, as neither of them has been offered ERA services. However, the analysis of post-
inflow labour market outcomes by Goodman and Sianesi (2007) has found non-participants to be 
somewhat higher performers than participants among NDLP entrants, but to have significantly 
worse employment outcomes among ND25+ entrants.16
To conclude, the non-participation problem seems to be a relevant one, both in terms of its 
incidence and of the diversity of the excluded groups, the latter being particularly the case in 
terms of labour market outcomes. Furthermore, the average figures were found to mask, at times, 
extreme variation by district, intake group and type of non-participant. Overall, the NDLP ERA study 
participants are on average slightly more likely to depend on government benefits than the average 
lone parent volunteering for NDLP. By contrast, the study participants in the ND25+ group are 
significantly	easier	to	employ	than	the	average	ND25+	entrant;	ERA	advisers	are	thus	working	with	a	
group which is considerably more advantaged than the average population, which potentially raises 
a creaming question for the experiment.
16 ND25+ non-participants had significantly worse employment outcomes than participants, 
facing a 21 per cent lower probability of being in employment and spending 19 per cent fewer 
days in work. By contrast, NDLP non-participants were somewhat higher performers than 
participants, mainly in terms of benefit outcomes (11 per cent fewer days on benefits).
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The fact that ERA was a study and involved random assignment thus seems to have significantly 
altered how the intake as a whole was handled in the context of Jobcentre Plus, as well as the 
nature of the adviser/New Deal entrant interaction in a way that would not have been the case 
if ERA had been normal policy. The fact that the pool of participants has been both reduced 
and altered is likely to have led to some loss in external validity or, alternatively, to some non-
participation bias in the experimental estimate for the effect on the eligible population. The analyses 
in the present report aim to formally assess and quantify the loss in external validity, or the amount 
of non-participation bias.
2.3 A note on the WTC group
This report only considers the issue of non-participation for the two main ERA target groups – the 
ND25+ and NDLP groups – which represent 83 per cent of all ERA study participants. The third ERA 
group, lone parents working part-time and in receipt of Working Tax Credit (WTC), is excluded from 
this analysis for both conceptual and data reasons.
For the two groups considered, prior to being offered the chance to participate in ERA, all individuals 
were committed to receiving back-to-work support from Jobcentre Plus. Since the ERA offer included 
all of the same services as New Deal, plus additional help (including the possibility of substantial 
monetary bonuses) it was expected that the overwhelming majority would agree to participate.17 
The expectation was that, were ERA to be implemented, it would be in place of the existing New 
Deals, so that all eligible individuals would necessarily participate. Moreover, because those who do 
not participate are, nevertheless, active benefit recipients and/or programme participants, there is 
useful data on their activities and outcomes. 
By contrast, the lone parents in the WTC group were not currently receiving any employment support 
from Jobcentre Plus. The intended target group was made up of those lone parents working between 
16 and 30 hours who were interested in increasing their hours to above 30. It was always anticipated 
that at most, 30 per cent of those potentially eligible would take up the offer and indeed the impact 
of interest has always been the average effect of the ERA offer for those WTC recipients who have 
volunteered to receive it, a potentially selected subgroup of the eligible WTC recipients contacted by 
letter or phone by Jobcentre Plus. This is thus a different parameter than the average effect of the 
offer of ERA for all eligibles, which was the relevant one for the other two ERA groups. Note, however, 
that both types of parameter are intention-to-treat parameters, that is, they consider the impact of 
offering ERA unconditional on the decision to take up ERA elements and services.18
As to the issue of diversion, the presumption was that all eligible WTC recipients in the six districts 
were to be contacted by Jobcentre Plus, made aware of ERA and offered the chance to participate 
in it. It does, however, appear that some eligible names were not called up by offices, although 
because of lack of data it has not been possible to assess the extent of this. The hope is that if this 
has indeed happened, it has happened in a random way.
In terms of formal refusal, as one might expect given the set-up, only a small minority of those WTC 
recipients who came to volunteer for ERA at Jobcentre Plus did then actually formally refuse before 
17 In the original ERA design, it was anticipated that 95 per cent of those offered the chance to 
participate	would	take	it	up;	the	issue	of	diversion	was	not	anticipated.
18 No WTC recipient who has come forward for ERA can actually be forced to meet with their 
adviser, follow their advice, retain work, undertake training, etc. The extent to which a WTC 
recipient who has volunteered for ERA actually uses ERA services is left to the individual’s 
choice, and is not conditioned upon when estimating (experimental) impacts.
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being randomly assigned, 0.6% (compared to 4.7% of NDLP and 14.6% of ND25+, all percentages 
being conditional on ERA offer). It is however noteworthy that a non-negligible share (4.4%) of those 
who came forward remained undecided, considerably larger than the fraction of undecided among 
NDLP (1.8 per cent) or ND25+ (1.6 per cent). Overall, what we define as formal refusers represent  
5.0 per cent of the WTC recipients who came forward, which is comparable to the corresponding 
share of NDLP, 6.6 per cent (but much lower than the 16.2 per cent ND25+ share).
It is important to note that for this third customer group, there is an additional potential source of 
bias in the composition of the experimental sample compared to the scenario in which ERA is run 
as an official policy. The limited information about ERA conveyed to potential participants is most 
likely to have affected the composition of WTC recipients deciding to volunteer for ERA under these 
circumstances. In other words, the WTC group who made a special journey to Jobcentre Plus offices 
(an organisation they may not have had any previous dealings with) to volunteer for a 50/50 chance 
to join a vaguely described intervention is most likely to differ from the WTC group who would 
come forward in a full-information situation. Again, it was the requirement not to disappoint the 
randomised-out controls that led the offices to explain very little (at least initially) about the actual 
generosity of ERA support and incentives. In a situation of normal operation of ERA, many more – and 
most likely quite different – WTC recipients would have come forward to participate in the ERA study.19 
The experimental impact on the smaller group who did come forward may, thus, not reflect what the 
impact would have been on the wider group who would have come forward in a normal setting.
As discussed, the issue of non-participation conceptually pertains to the WTC group too, but it has 
more layers to it and is even more complex given the element of individual choice that defines the 
population of interest (i.e. those eligible WTC recipients who have come forward to volunteer for 
ERA). Any analysis of non-participation for this group would need to speculate about what the WTC 
group’s participation in ERA in the six evaluation districts would have been if ERA had been an official 
policy requiring eligible WTC recipients to actively apply for it.
Moreover,	many	WTC	recipients	eligible	for	ERA	have	neither	been	on	benefits	nor	on	programmes;	
for them there is no Department for Work and Pensions (DWP)/ Work and Pensions Longitudinal 
Study (WPLS) data at all. 
For both conceptual and data reasons the issue of non-participation among the WTC group is, thus, 
not considered in this analysis.
2.4 Experimental analysis and non-participation analysis 
Many causal parameters of interest are the effect of some ‘treatment’ averaged over the relevant 
population. To place the experimental and non-participation analyses into proper context, 
it is important to clarify both the type of ‘treatment’ being evaluated as well as the relevant 
population(s) over which to average its effect.
In order to do this, consider how the decision to participate in a programme can be broken down 
into a series of steps. The stage at which randomisation is applied determines what can be learnt 
from an experiment, in other words, the causal parameter it retrieves. In the case of ERA, an 
individual needs to:
19 A WTC recipient who decided to come forward would immediately qualify for free training 
and the training bonus, plus have immediate access to the In Work Emergency Fund. Coming 
forward would thus entail an immediate and certain benefit (as opposed to the New Deal 
entrants who, being still in unemployment, might view such incentives as more remote).
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1 Satisfy the criteria for ERA eligibility
Starting the ND25+ or NDLP programmes during the sample intake window in the six evaluation 
districts would make one eligible for ERA.
2 Become aware of ERA and realise own eligibility
In the demonstration, information about ERA and one’s eligibility to its services and support came 
predominantly from Jobcentre Plus staff. However, this information somehow did not reach a non-
negligible share of the eligible population (9.4 per cent of eligible ND25+ and 26.4 per cent of eligible 
NDLP).
3 Apply for ERA if application is necessary
As an official policy, one might envisage that:
a ERA would become an integral component of the New Deal programme in which any New 
Deal	participant	would	automatically	be	enrolled;	in	this	case,	no	formal	application	process	
would be necessary. Alternatively, 
b New Deal participants would need to make their eligibility operational by registering with the 
ERA programme to be allocated to an adviser. 
In the experimental evaluation, there was no formal application process but study participants had 
to give their consent to taking part in the research and being randomly assigned.20
4 Decide on the take-up of services
ERA was a voluntary programme in the sense that it was up to the participating individuals to 
decide whether, and to what extent, to avail themselves of the ERA elements. Specifically, eligible 
individuals became entitled to employment-related assistance from a dedicated adviser and those 
working at least 30 hours qualified for a work retention bonus as well as for a training bonus should 
they also undertake training. However, it always remained up to them to decide whether they 
wanted to avail themselves of such a support package or not. For instance, around 15 per cent of 
the programme group in either New Deal intake group reported that they had had no contact at 
all with Jobcentre Plus staff during the 12-month period following their randomisation into the 
treatment group. Furthermore, some programme group members may simply not have been aware 
of, or have forgotten, some of the ERA features, as testified by around one-quarter of either New 
Deal programme group who had not heard of the employment bonus and as many as half or more  
(49 per cent for NDLP and 57 per cent in the ND25+) who were not aware of the training bonus one 
year into the study.
The experimental estimator of the impact of ERA was applied to Stage 3, i.e. unconditional on the 
take-up of services. In the presence of take-up decisions (Stage 4), it provides an estimate of the 
mean impact of the offer of ERA services and incentives.
For many purposes, this is the policy-relevant parameter, as it is informative on how the availability 
of ERA services and incentives affects individual outcomes, where it is implicitly acknowledged that 
non-take up is a normal feature of any ongoing programme.
Furthermore, the ERA intervention itself represents an offer of support and incentives. The 
experimental estimator is thus perfectly suited to recover the impact of offering ERA services and 
20 Those consenting to take part would sign that ‘I understand that if I sign this form I agree to 
take part in the study. I understand that I am free to pull out of the study at any time.’ Those 
formally refusing would by contrast sign that ‘I do not consent to taking part in this research 
scheme or to being randomly assigned.’
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incentives. As mentioned, it is unconditional on the actual take-up of the services or even actual 
knowledge of the services and incentive structure.
Thus, coming back to the first issue the section set out to clarify, i.e. the type of ‘treatment’ being 
evaluated, both the experimental evaluation and the present non-experimental analysis share the 
same type of ‘treatment’: being offered the ERA package of support, or, equivalently, becoming 
eligible for the ERA package of support.
Now, let us consider the population of interest over which to average the impact of being offered ERA. 
One might envisage that the policymaker would be interested in assessing the impact of offering ERA 
at the eligibility level (Stage 1), as well as at the level of application/registration (Stage 3).21
To better understand where the experimental parameter fits into this discussion, Figure 2.1 shows the 
structure of selection into the ERA study group, where the Roman numerals highlight the fact that the 
second, third and fourth stages and related populations do not necessarily correspond to those under 
official-policy running of ERA, where ‘official-policy running’ means a situation in which ERA would be 
available to all ND25+ and NDLP entrants in the six districts (either as part of a national policy or if the 
programme had been piloted in the six districts according to a pilot versus comparison area-based 
evaluation scheme). In the demonstration, only parts of the target population entered the evaluation 
sample: some eligible individuals actively refused to be randomly assigned and take part in the 
experimental evaluation (formal refusers), while some were somehow not even offered the possibility 
to participate in random assignment and hence, in ERA (diverted customers). The experimental 
estimate is thus conditional on being actually given the chance to participate in the study and on 
having formally consented to do so and to be randomly assigned, providing an estimate of the impact 
of ERA eligibility for those who have reached the randomisation stage and have agreed to participate 
in the study – the ERA study participants (Stage III). 
Figure 2.1 From eligibility to service receipt in the ERA demonstration
21 Yet another interesting – though hard to identify – parameter would be the mean effect of 
actual receipt of ERA support and services for those who effectively took it up (Stage 4).
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The problem is that the subgroup of ERA study participants is potentially a selective one, i.e. not 
necessarily representative of the full eligible population (Stage 1) nor of the subgroup who  
would apply for ERA if it was an official policy which required individuals to actively apply for it 
(Stage 3b).
As to the latter point, it seems hard to believe that all those who have refused to take part in 
the experiment and all those who were not even offered such a possibility would not have been 
interested in registering for ERA had it been an official policy. On the contrary, one could argue that 
if ERA had been an official policy, a non-negligible share of the current non-participants would have 
been aware of the programme and consented to taking part in it, i.e. would have applied for ERA if 
required, as in Stage 3b.
Consider first the diverted customers, eligible New Deal entrants who were not told about their 
chance to participate in ERA. As with any government scheme, there is always the issue of how 
much individuals know about a policy and their eligibility for it. However, under official-policy 
running of ERA, Jobcentre Plus staff would not be the only source of information. Enhanced eligible 
individuals’ knowledge of ERA would correspondingly reduce advisers’ discretion as to how to 
market, present and sell ERA – including not mentioning it at all. 
As to the formal refusers, it is not fully clear how much they actually knew about what they were 
refusing – according to observations at intake interviews and interviews with the unemployed 
themselves after those sessions, not much.22 If ERA were an official policy, there would be no 
need to severely restrict information on the actual extent of ERA support in order to prevent 
disappointment among the control group23 (nor in fact would there be a need to perform 
randomisation24). It is highly plausible that even under full information some refusers, especially 
among the ND25+ group, would still have been reluctant to prolong contact with Jobcentre Plus, all 
the more likely if they did not intend to be especially proactive in looking for work25. With complete 
information, however, the ERA package would seem very appealing, making it hard to envisage that 
all the formal refusers would have knowingly still refused to become eligible for monetary incentives, 
training and support once in employment. In conclusion, if ERA had been an official policy of type 
(Stage 3b), there still would have been some eligible individuals who would have formally refused to 
apply for it, but it is reasonable to presume that this group would have been much smaller than the 
group of formal refusers actually observed in the ERA study. 
22 Walker et al. (2006) conclude that ‘very few customers could be described as understanding 
ERA, and all of them had already been assigned to the programme group and therefore 
had been given further details about the services available after random assignment’. More 
generally, ‘there was a consensus among the Technical Advisers who conducted both the 
observations and the interviews with customers […] that most customers truly did not have a 
good appreciation of ERA.’ (p.43).
23 This was relaxed over time, although Walker et al. (2006, p.22) conclude that ‘when invited to 
participate in ERA, customers would generally have known only that some form of extra help 
was potentially available if they found work and that they had a 50-50 chance of receiving it’.
24 Formally, formal refusers were signing that they did ‘not consent in taking part in this research 
scheme or to being randomly assigned’.
25 Although there would be nothing to lose to become formally eligible by registering with the 
programme (as one can then always decide to refuse to take up its services), the qualitative 
analysis has highlighted that especially among ND25+ entrants there is often a tendency to 
resist any involvement with Jobcentre Plus beyond what is minimally necessary.
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Based on the above discussion for both the diverted customers and formal refusers, it is, thus, highly 
likely that a large proportion of the non-participants actually observed in the ERA demonstration 
would have participated in ERA had it been an official policy of the type at Stage 3b, so that the 
full eligible population might represent a closer proxy than the experimental study group of the 
population that would participate in ERA were it an official policy that requires eligible individuals 
to apply for it. Furthermore, if ERA had been an official policy superimposed by default on the New 
Deals (i.e. of the type at Stage 3a)), the full eligible population would by construction coincide with 
the group of participants of interest.
One might wonder whether the observed non-participants in the ERA study would actually have not 
availed themselves of ERA services and incentives (Stage 4) even if they had joined the programme. 
Indeed, under certain assumptions one can assess whether the non-participants are individuals 
who even if offered ERA services would not take them up. Estimates of the type of involvement that 
the non-participants would have had with ERA and more generally with Jobcentre Plus had they 
participated in the evaluation study are presented in Section 5.3.2.
The interest of the current report in the full eligible population does not, however, hinge on 
conjectures about what the participation in ERA would have been if ERA had been an official policy 
requiring individuals to actively apply for it (the type at Stage 3b). A policymaker can only make the 
ERA support package available, but cannot force eligible individuals to apply for it or to take up its 
services. Hence, the causal effect for the eligible population of making such a package available – 
unconditional on application (if required) and service take-up – is a parameter of paramount policy 
relevance. Specifically, this report considers the mean effect of ERA offer/availability for all those 
eligible	for	ERA	in	the	six	districts,	irrespective	of:	how	well	informed	they	are	about	ERA;	whether	
they	realise	their	eligibility	or	not;	whether	they	apply	or	not;	and	whether	they	take	up	its	services	
or not. As mentioned, this is the same type of parameter recovered by the experimental study (the 
effect of offering ERA), but it is averaged over the full eligible group, rather than over an adviser-
selected and self-selected subgroup of the eligible population.
A related way to appreciate the importance of this group and hence, the meaning of this parameter, 
as well as to envisage more fully how ERA as an official policy could work, is to think of ERA as a type 
of Stage 3a policy, that is, as a seamless next stage of the New Deal programmes in which any New 
Deal participant would automatically be enrolled. In other words, the unemployed would make no 
decisions about ERA per se when enrolling in the New Deal, but would automatically be offered the 
ERA package once having entered full-time work.26 A scenario in which all New Deal entrants are 
automatically ‘opted in’ for ERA gives direct and high policy relevance to the full New Deal sample, 
the focus of this report. Indeed, this is how ERA worked for the ERA study participants who were 
enrolled into the ERA programme at the time of entering their respective New Deal programme.27
The ERA experiment was carefully planned and designed: assignment to the control or to the 
programme group has taken place after the individual had agreed to participate, and randomisation 
has been shown to have balanced very well the study participants between a programme group and 
a control group that are statistically equivalent. The experiment can, thus, produce highly reliable 
26 An eligible worker could of course always opt out of ERA – both formally if there were such 
a proviso and de facto as they could not be forced (or sanctioned) into taking up the ERA 
package.
27 It was a conscious design decision to make the ERA offer at the point of joining New Deal, 
rather than making the offer at the point at which individuals moved into work. Partly this 
was so that the adviser could offer advice about retention and advancement at the earliest 
possible stage, but mostly it was to offer a seamless service that would contain drop-out rates.
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estimates of the effect of ERA for the ERA study participants (technically, it has high internal validity 
in recovering the effect of ERA for the participants). 
The question this report focuses on relates to how the effect for the ERA study participants relates 
(or generalises) to a wider population. The analysis moves beyond the experimental sample to 
consider what the impact of ERA would have been on its full intended population, how it compares 
to the impact estimated for the ERA study participants, and what kind of impact the non-
participants would have experienced, on average, had they become eligible for ERA. The problems 
investigated in this report are, thus, circumscribed to an issue of external validity, or the inference 
that can be validly drawn from the experimental set-up for the eligible population (in the six 
evaluation districts).
An alternative view to consider this issue defines the parameter of interest as the effect for those 
eligible for ERA (in the six districts) and assesses the scope for bias in the experimental estimate for 
this parameter. Does a non-participation rate of 26.6 per cent bias the experimental estimate for the 
treatment effect of interest?
It is important to note that this report is concerned with the current experimental evaluation, i.e. it 
considers the eligible group within the six ERA districts over the study intake window. There is in fact 
the wider generalisability question that has a national rollout in mind and which relates to how the 
experimental results obtained in the six evaluation districts would generalise to all other districts 
in which ERA has not been tested. This complex, and necessarily somewhat speculative, type of 
analysis would need to address the issue of how the six districts currently offering ERA compare 
to those not offering ERA in terms of composition of New Deal entrants and of local labour market 
conditions. Ideally, it would also try to take into account entry effects (e.g. more lone parents 
volunteering for the ‘NDLP with ERA’ package, or some long-term unemployed delaying their job 
entry to become eligible for the ‘ND25+ with ERA’ package), as well as general equilibrium effects.
2.5 Summary
To summarise the discussion in this chapter (see also Table 2.1):
•	 Interest	lies	in	the	effect	of	offering ERA services and incentives.
•	 One	can	consider	the	average	impact	of	the	ERA	offer	at	various	stages	of	participation,	in	
particular for: 
-	 the	eligible	population	(the	focus	of	the	present	report);
-	 the	ERA	study	participants	(the	focus	of	the	experimental	evaluation);
- those who would apply for ERA if it were an official policy requiring formal application (neither 
the experimental study group, nor the full eligible population, though the full eligible population 
is	arguably	a	closer	proxy);
- the eligible population if, as an official policy, ERA were an integral component of the New Deal 
programmes (the focus of the present report).
•	 This	report	is	concerned	with	the	external	validity	of	the	experimental	impact	estimate:	what	one	
can infer from the ERA study participants for the full eligible population. Alternatively, this report 
assesses the scope of ‘non-participation bias’ in the experimental estimate for the average impact 
on the eligible population.
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Table 2.1 Some causal effects of interest
Mean impact of offering ERA for:
• those eligible for ERA Stage 1=I Current report
• the ERA study participants Stage III Experimental estimate
• those who would apply for ERA if it were an official 
policy requiring formal application
Stage 3 Arguably much closer to eligible 
group than to ERA study participants
• those eligible for ERA if as an official policy it were an 
integral component of the New Deal programmes
Stage 1=I Current report
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3 Data and sample definition
3.1 Data
A number of data files have been put together for this analysis. The administrative data held by 
the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) on New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+) and New Deal for Lone 
Parents (NDLP) entrants provide the sampling frame. Files were extracted for all cases identified 
as having entered these New Deal programmes in the six districts over the relevant random 
assignment period, as detailed in Section 3.2. The New Deal extract files have further been exploited 
for information about past programme participation as well as a number of other relevant individual 
characteristics.
These files have then been merged with other DWP data on benefit and employment spells – the 
Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study (WPLS) dataset. This spell-level dataset contains information 
from DWP’s Master Index about time on benefits (such as Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA), Income 
Support (IS) or Incapacity Benefit (IB)) and from Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs (HMRC) records 
about time in employment and tax year earnings. These administrative records have been used to 
construct both detailed labour market histories and outcome measures.
The administrative data has further been combined with data collected specifically for the 
Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) experimental evaluation in the form of the 
Basic Information Form (BIF). This file contains all New Deal entrants who were approached for 
recruitment into ERA, including the identifier of those who formally refused to participate. This data 
is used mainly to draw information on individuals’ decisions about participation in ERA, as well as the 
outcome of random assignment (control/programme group) for those who agreed to participate in 
the study.
Finally, local-area level data (travel-to-work and super-output area data) has been merged in. 
Section 3.3 summarises the extensive variables that have been selected and derived from all of 
these sources.
3.2 Sample
To perform the analyses aiming at estimating the impact of ERA for the full ERA eligible population, 
one obviously needs to start by clarifying exactly what is meant by ‘ERA eligibility’. This is a 
conceptual issue which requires the analyst to decide on who should count as eligible. For such a 
definition to be operational, the criteria that determine ERA eligibility must also enable identification 
of the relevant individuals in the data.28
For the purposes of this analysis, which relates to the current experimental evaluation, the following 
groups are, thus, considered as eligible for ERA29: 
28 See Goodman and Sianesi (2007) for a description of how problem cases were handled and 
what adjustments were performed on the ERA experimental sample.
29 The rationale underpinning the following definition of ERA eligibility is that Jobcentre Plus 
staff were instructed that those who became mandatory for ND25+ or expressed an interest 
in NDLP during the random assignment window would be eligible for ERA. Those among 
these groups who effectively came to the office to start their New Deal programme at some 
point during the random assignment window should, thus, have been offered the chance to 
participate in ERA.
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• those who have become mandated for ND25+ during the period when the respective district was 
conducting random assignment and who subsequently also started the Gateway still within the 
relevant	random	assignment	intake	window;	and
• those lone parents who were told about NDLP (had a WFI and/or expressed an interest in NDLP) 
during the period when the respective district was conducting random assignment and who 
subsequently also volunteered for NDLP still within the relevant random assignment intake window.
The random assignment window (or sample intake window) is actually district- and intake group-
specific, since one district started conducting random assignment later than the others and some 
districts stopped conducting random assignment for some groups earlier. To identify the eligible 
population, the period when each district was conducting random assignment was defined as 
follows:
North West England:  3 January 2004  to 31 January 2005 
All other districts: 1 November 2003 to 31 October 2004, with the exception of 
   to 21 August 2004 for NDLP in South East Wales.
The following tables provide various sample breakdowns by participation status, separately for the 
two intake groups and by district. Section 2.3 has already provided a more detailed discussion of 
non-participation	patterns;	the	following	just	summarises	the	main	points.
The incidence of non-participation was substantial: about one-quarter (26.6 per cent) of all those eligible 
to take part in the ERA study did not participate. Non-participation was substantially lower amongst the 
ND25+ group (23 per cent of all eligible entrants) than amongst NDLP entrants (over 30 per cent).
For both intake groups, Scotland saw the lowest proportion of non-participation, with around nine 
per	cent	of	ND25+	and	five	per	cent	of	NDLP	eligible	entrants	not	participating	in	ERA;	North	West	
England is not far behind at around 15 per cent of all ND25+ eligible individuals and six per cent of 
all NDLP eligible individuals not participating. South East Wales and North East London saw closer 
to average levels of non-participation, whilst East Midlands and North East England saw the highest 
non-participation levels amongst both intake groups. In particular, in East Midlands almost half  
(47 per cent) of all eligible NDLP entrants did not take part in ERA. East Midlands in fact accounts for 
well over one-third of total non-participants, followed by London (27 per cent of all non-participants) 
and by North East England (20 per cent).
Table 3.1 Sample breakdown by intake group 
ND25 NDLP
N % % N % %
Eligible population 7,796 100.0 7,261 100.0
– Study non-participants 1,790 23.0 2,209 30.4
– Study participants 6,006 77.0 100.0 5,052 69.6 100.0
 – with survey outcome 1,840 30.6 1,745 34.5
 – without survey outcome 4,166 69.4 3,307 65.5
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Table 3.4 Non-participation breakdown by district
Overall ND25+ NDLP
N % N % N %
Scotland 94 2.4 71 4.0 23 1.0
North East England 783 19.6 377 21.1 406 18.4
North West England 285 7.1 235 13.1 50 2.3
South East Wales 278 7.0 119 6.7 159 7.2
East Midlands 1,481 37.0 472 26.4 1,009 45.7
London 1,078 27.0 516 28.8 562 25.4
Total 3,999 100.0 1,790 100.0 2,209 100.0
3.3 Outcomes and observable characteristics 
This report assesses the impacts of ERA on employment and earnings outcomes during a 48-month 
follow-up period. The analyst can crucially exploit administrative records for the full sample of those 
eligible for ERA in the six evaluation districts, i.e. for the participants and, most importantly for this 
analysis’ purposes, for the non-participants too. 
For the employment measures the 48-month follow-up period is counted from the moment 
individuals flowed in (i.e. from the moment ND25+ entrants started the Gateway, or lone parents 
volunteered for NDLP), and consider both the probability of having ever been in employment and the 
total number of days in employment during that period.
The earnings outcomes considered are taken from P14 tax records. Focus is on cumulative earnings 
between the 2005/06 and 2008/09 tax years, as well as on the most recent earnings, those for 
the 2008/09 tax year. The main analysis also looks at tax year earnings for previous post-random 
assignment years. Depending on when during the tax year a person flowed into the sample, these 
earnings measures will pertain to X to (X+1) years post inflow as follows:
P14 earnings for the: Correspond to:
2005/06 tax year 1-2 years post-random assignment
2006/07 tax year 2-3 years post-random assignment
2007/08 tax year 3-4 years post-random assignment
2008/09 tax year 4-5 years post-random assignment
2005/06 to 2008/09 tax years 1-4 or 2-5 years post-random assignment
An extensive collection of variables has been put together aimed at capturing the widest possible 
range of individual, office and local area characteristics that are most likely to affect individuals’ 
labour market outcomes, and that might potentially have affected selection into the ERA sample. 
Note that all of these variables have to be defined both for the ERA study participants and the  
non-participants, which entails that such information has to be derived from administrative data 
sources alone.
Table	3.5	groups	and	summarises	the	various	observable	factors	used	in	the	analysis;	the	table	
also briefly comments on the variables and lists the omitted category for discrete or categorical 
variables. Section 4.3.1 contains a more detailed discussion of the content of the data.
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Table 3.5 Summary of observed characteristics 
Era district
5 District dummies  
(compared to London)
Inflow month
13 dummies for month of ‘showing up’: 
2nd to 13th month  
(compared to 1st month)
District-specific month from random assignment 
start when the individual started the ND25+ Gateway 
or volunteered for NDLP
Demographics
Female  
(compared to male)
Age at inflow and age squared and missing age
Ethnic Minority  
(compared to white)
Disability indicator 
Disability indicator: if has a disability at inflow and/or 
if claiming IB at inflowMissing disability status  
(compared to non-disabled)
Has partner
Missing partner information  
(compared to having no partner) For ND25+
2 children
For NDLP≥3 children
Missing child information  
(compared to 1 child)
Youngest child <1 yr 
For NDLP1-5 yrs at inflow 
Age of youngest child missing  
(compared to children aged 6-18)
Current spell
Not on benefits at inflow For NDLP
Employed at inflow Indicator of very recent/current employment
Shows up same day Showing up defined as the time between becoming 
mandatory for ND25+ and starting the Gateway (for 
ND25+ group), or between being told about NDLP 
and volunteering for it (for NDLP group)
Shows up within 30 days  
(compared to showing up after more than 30 days)
Early entrant into ND25+ programme For ND25+
Spent <540 days on JSA before entering ND25+
Continued
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Table 3.5 Continued
Labour market history
Past participation in basic skills Indicator of basic skills need
Past participation in voluntary programmes Number of previous spells on: NDLP, New Deal for 
Musicians, New Deal Innovation Fund, New Deal 
Disabled People, Work Based Learning for Adults 
(WBLA) or Outreach
Past participation in ND25+ programme For ND25+
Spent:
0%
more than 0 but less than 50%
more than 50% but less than 100% 
of the past 3 years on active benefits  
(compared to having spent 100% of the time)
Summary of active benefit history
Active benefits are JSA and compensation from 
NDYP, ND25+, Employment Zones and WBLA and 
Basic Skills.
Spent: 
0% 
more than 0 but less than 50%
more than 50% but less than 100% 
of the past 3 years on inactive benefits  
(compared to having spent 100% of the time)
Summary of inactive benefit history
Inactive benefits are IS and IB
Spent more than 0 but less than 25%
more than 25% but less than 50% 
more than 50% 
of the past 3 years in employment  
(compared to never employed in the 3 years before)
Summary of employment history
Local conditions
Total New Deal caseload at office (100s) Office indicator
Share of lone parents in New Deal caseload at office Office indicator
Quintiles of the index of multiple deprivation: 
bottom, 2nd, 3rd and 4th  
(compared to top quintile)
Index of local deprivation at the Super Output Area 
(SOA) level 
Note: top quintile is the most disadvantaged
Local unemployment rate Travel-to-work-level unemployment rate
Postcode missing or incorrect
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4 Methodological approaches
This chapter starts by setting up the framework and basic notation. It then briefly outlines, in some 
more detail, the different methodological approaches and their underlying assumptions, mainly 
to be in a position to highlight some issues which are important for a correct interpretation of the 
empirical results. 
Throughout, the discussion is kept as informal as its rather technical nature allows. For those who 
would still rather skip this chapter, the following is a very straightforward summary of the three 
approaches that have been adopted, which should be sufficient to allow one to follow the results in 
Chapter 5:
a A simple bounds analysis
 Given that the outcomes the non-participants would have experienced had they participated in 
Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) and been assigned to the treatment group are 
unobserved, one can look at what would have happened had they participated and all been in 
employment (the upper bound of the overall impact) and if they had participated and none of 
them got a job (the lower bound).
b Looking at observable differences between participants and non-participants
 If one assumes that the only outcome-relevant differences between participants and non-
participants are those which are captured in the many characteristics observed in the data, 
such as age, gender, duration on benefit, labour market history, etc., then by looking at the ERA 
outcomes for programme group members observationally similar to the non-participants, one 
can estimate what the outcomes of the latter would have been had they participated. (One 
can similarly estimate which aspects of the ERA service the non-participants would have been 
expected to take up.)
c Recognising that non-participants may differ from participants in important ways that the 
analyst cannot directly observe, one can test whether this is in fact the case, and experiment 
with a control function approach to allow for this residual bias.
4.1 Analysis framework
The section starts by setting up the framework and introducing some basic notation. Figure 4.1 
highlights the structure of the problem that needs to be address, while Box 4.1 summarises  
the notation.
The population of interest are those eligible to be offered ERA services, i.e. all those becoming 
unemployed in the six districts over the study intake window. The potential selection into the ERA 
study is represented by the binary variable Q, where Q=0 denotes individuals who despite being 
eligible have not been randomly assigned, while Q=1 denotes the ERA study participants, i.e. those 
eligible individuals who were offered the chance to participate in the ERA study and who gave their 
consent to be randomly assigned. Participating (Q=1) individuals make up the experimental group 
which was randomly assigned between a programme group who was offered ERA services (R=1) and 
a control group which was not (R=0).
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Figure 4.1 Simplified structure of the problem
Box 4.1 Notation
Q=1 ERA study participants (the experimental sample)
Q=0 non-participants
R=1 individuals randomly assigned to the programme group conditional on Q=1
R=0 individuals randomly assigned to the control group conditional on Q=1
X  observed characteristics
p  probability of non-participation among the eligible population
Y1  potential outcome if offered ERA services 
Y0  potential outcome if not offered ERA services
Y  observed outcome
ATE average ERA effect on all those eligible for ERA (parameter of interest)
ATE1 average ERA effect on ERA study participants (experimental estimate)
ATE0 average ERA effect on non-participants 
The problem here arises due to changes in the participation pattern potentially introduced by 
the experimental evaluation. In particular, because of diversion and of refusal to be randomly 
assigned, the population under the experimental evaluation (Q=1) does not correspond to the full 
eligible population, made up by the (Q=1) and (Q=0) groups. If selection has taken place into the 
participating group, the composition of participants will be different from the composition of the 
eligible population, and impacts estimated on participants will not necessarily be representative of 
the impacts that the eligible population would have experienced.
Eligible population in the six districts
Study participants (the experimental sample)
Q=1
Study non-participants
Q=0
Control group
R=0
Programme group
R=1
Selection?
RA
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Let p be the probability of non-participation among the eligible group. This is directly identified in the 
data by the proportion of non-participants among the eligible population (see Tables 3.1-3.3).
Denote the observed outcome by Y and define the two potential outcomes: Y1 as the outcome if 
offered ERA services (treatment outcome) and Y0 as the outcome if not offered ERA services 
(the no-treatment outcome). 
The parameter of interest is the average effect of ERA on the full ERA eligible population in the six 
districts (the Average Treatment Effect – ATE), defined as the average outcome for all those eligible 
for ERA if they were offered ERA services compared to the average outcome for all those eligible for 
ERA if they were not offered ERA services:
 ATE1  E(Y1 – Y0)
What one can however directly identify from the available experimental data is the average effect 
of ERA for participants in the experiment, 1 1 0 . This is because the experiment 
provides the average effect of the programme for individuals who have been randomly assigned.
Denote the average impact of ERA on the excluded eligible individuals (i.e. on the non-participants) 
by
ATE   E(Y  – Y  | Q=1)
 ATE0  E(Y1 – Y0 | Q=0) = E(Y1 | Q=0) - E(Y0 | Q=0) 
Using the law of iterated expectations, the parameters ATE and ATE1 are linked according to:
 ATE = (1–p)•ATE1 + p•ATE0 (1)
    
Equation (1) simply states that the parameter of interest, i.e. the average impact of ERA on all 
eligible individuals in the six districts, is given by a weighted average of the parameter one can 
reliably estimate using random assignment, i.e. the impact on the participants ATE1, and of the 
impact on the non-participants ATE0, with weights given by the relative share of participants and 
non-participants within the eligible pool, p.
Non-participation thus poses a serious problem if it is both widespread (the share of non-participants 
p is sizeable) and selective (participants and non-participants are significantly different in terms of 
(observed and/or unobserved) characteristics that affect potential outcomes and hence, programme 
impacts (i.e. ATE1 is very different from ATE0).
Previous work (Goodman and Sianesi, 2007) has focused on assessing and documenting the size 
of p, finding that about one quarter of the target population did not participate The current report 
directly aims at estimating ATE0 and assessing how different it is from ATE1. Note though that 
whereas the relative size of non-participants (p) is observed in the data, how different the effect of 
the programme would have been for them compared to participants remains unobserved, since 
ATE0 is not identified in the data. The effect for non-participants and the effect for the eligible 
population cannot thus be directly identified, unless additional assumptions are made.
Note that in this set-up one can exploit administrative employment and earnings data on all those 
eligible for ERA. This means that one does observe an outcome for the non-participants: the no-
treatment outcome. The average outcome that the non-participants would have experienced had 
they not been offered ERA thus coincides with their average observed outcome:  
E(Y0 | Q=0) = E(Y | Q=0). Hence to answer the question of how different the average impact for the 
eligible population would have been compared to the experimental impact for the participants, 
the only unobserved term is the outcome that the non-participants would have experienced, on 
average, had they been offered ERA services, E(Y1 | Q=0). Equation (1) thus becomes:
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 ATE = (1–p)•ATE  + p•{E(Y  | Q=0) - E(Y | Q=0)} (1a)1 1
This report assesses how different the average impact on participants is from the average impact 
on the eligible population based on the following three identification strategies for E(Y1 | Q=0) and 
hence for ATE:
• bounds for the ATE that can be obtained without having to make any assumption on the selection 
process;
• identification of the ATE	under	the	assumption	of	selection	on	observable	characteristics;
• identification of the ATE allowing for selection on unobserved characteristics and impacts.
Before turning to a description of these strategies, let us consider under what conditions the average 
impact for those taken through random assignment would be the same as the average impact for the 
full eligible population even in the presence of a non-negligible share of non-participants. For this to 
be the case, it is necessary that the decision (either by the adviser or by the individual) to participate in 
ERA is not correlated with the individual gain from receiving ERA services. (Note that a trivial example 
of this is where the programme effect is exactly the same for everybody in the population, regardless 
of their characteristics, which would be an exceedingly implausible assumption.)
Programme effects are defined as the difference between the outcome if treated and the 
outcome	if	non-treated;	in	turn,	the	two	potential	outcomes	depend	on	observed	and	unobserved	
characteristics of the individual and locality they live in. Hence, without invoking the questionable 
homogenous-effect assumption, the issue boils down to whether the participating and non-
participating groups systematically differ in terms of observed and unobserved characteristics which 
affect potential outcomes and hence, programme effects. In particular, if the two groups were not 
significantly different, or in other words if the experimental sample were just a random sample of 
the full eligible population, non-participation would only pose an efficiency (precision) issue but 
would not bias the impact estimate for the eligible population.
Further analysis is thus needed when effects are allowed to be heterogeneous and it cannot be ruled 
out that selection into the experimental study (at least partially) depends on them (or on variables 
related to them). 
4.2 Bounds without assumptions on the selection process
For this type of analysis, outcomes need to be bounded. This is obviously the case for discrete events 
such as being employed or not. To fix ideas, suppose ERA is being evaluated in terms of employment 
probability, so that the outcome Y is bounded between 0 and 1.
From equation (1a), the lower bound for the effect on the eligible population is obtained by 
assuming that none of the non-participants would have gone into employment from the 
programme (even if some of them are observed to have entered work without going through ERA), 
the upper one by assuming that all non-participants would have been in work had they received 
ERA:
•	 lower	bound:	(1–p)•ATE1 – p•E(Y | Q=0)
•	 upper	bound:	(1–p)•ATE1 + p•(1–E(Y | Q=0))
The width of the bound is given by p, the proportion of non-participants in the eligible group. 
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4.2.1 Sensitivity analysis 
One can further explore how sensitive the estimate of the effect on the eligible population is to 
assumptions about the selection process into the group of study participants, as reflected by 
assumptions on the relative magnitude of the average outcome under ERA for participants and for 
non-participants.
Specifically, assume that the average ERA outcome that the non-participants would have 
experienced had they participated in the study is  times the average ERA outcome of the 
participants, as identified by the actual outcome of the programme group.
From equation (1a), the effect for the eligible group can then be calculated as a function of Ө:
 ATE
Ө
 = (1–p)•ATE1 + p•{Ө E(Y | R=1) – E(Y | Q=0)}
Ө
By varying the values of Ө, one can depict different types of selection processes: Ө=1 represents the 
case where decisions to participate in the ERA study are unrelated to treatment outcomes, while 
Ө<1 (Ө>1) the case where non-participants would have experienced on average lower (higher) 
outcomes under ERA than what the participants experience.
To clarify with a numerical example, suppose that 30 per cent of the non-participants and  
30 per cent of the ERA control group were employed, and that 40 per cent of all those assigned 
to the ERA programme group were employed. The impact on participants’ employment rate is 
therefore 10 percentage points. Setting Ө=0.5 would amount to assuming that the non-participants 
would	have	had	an	employment	rate	of	0.5•40	per	cent,	i.e.	20	per	cent,	had	they	participated.	
With a 25 per cent non-participation rate, the average treatment effect for all eligibles would thus 
be	0.75•10	+	0.25•(20–30)	=	5.	If	on	the	other	hand	Ө=1.5, i.e. it is assumed that non-participants 
would have had an employment rate of 60 per cent had they participated, then the overall 
treatment	effect	on	the	eligibles	would	be	0.75•10	+	0.25•(60–30)	=	15.
4.3 Impact estimates under selection on observables
4.3.1 Selection on observable characteristics
This and the next section describe two sets of methods aimed at arriving at a point estimate of the 
effect for the eligible population. While the two methods differ in terms of the assumptions they 
make on the selection process into the ERA study (one rules out outcome-relevant unobservable 
determinants, the other allows for them as well), both rely on the assumption that treatment and 
no-treatment outcomes among the eligible group are not affected by whether an individual is 
offered the chance to participate in the ERA study or not.
The approaches outlined in this section provide estimates of the average ERA impact for the non-
participants (and hence for the eligible population) which can only take into account observed 
differences between non-participants and ERA study participants. To the extent that unobserved 
differences between the two groups are important determinants of subsequent labour market 
outcomes, these will erroneously show up as part of the ERA impact estimates. 
The reliability of such estimates thus crucially depends on the range and quality of characteristics 
observed.	Section	3.3	has	summarised	the	available	data;	in	the	following,	its	content	in	relation	to	
the estimation problem to be addressed is briefly addressed. 
All the outcomes of interest – employment probabilities and durations as well as earnings – are 
related to labour market performance. As listed in Table 3.5, an extensive collection of individual, 
office and local area characteristics has been assembled that are most likely to affect individuals’ 
labour market performance, and that might potentially have affected participation in the ERA study. 
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In addition to a number of individual demographic characteristics contained in the administrative 
data (gender, age, ethnicity, partner and children, disability and illness), the data include summary 
information on an individual’s current unemployment spell, including, in particular, indicators of a 
very recent/current employment spell, how long it took them to start the Gateway or volunteer for 
New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) once having become mandatory for it or being told about it, and 
of whether New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+) entrants volunteered for the Gateway ahead of time.
Three years’ worth of labour market history has also been constructed, with variables summarising 
the proportion of time employed and the proportion spent on benefits, separately on active benefits 
(JSA and compensation whilst on a labour market programme) and inactive benefits (Income 
Support (IS) and Incapacity Benefit (IB)). The data also include variables capturing the extent of 
past participation in voluntary employment programmes (as a crude indicator of willingness to 
improve one’s circumstances), in ND25+ (a mandatory programme) and in Basic Skills (a programme 
designed to address basic literacy, numeracy and IT skills).
Furthermore, information has been collected on local labour market conditions (specifically, travel-
to-work area unemployment rates), as well as on the deprivation of the area the individual lives in 
(index of local deprivation). Additionally, information at the office level (total New Deal caseload 
and share of lone parents in such a caseload) has been constructed to capture office-specific 
characteristics that might impact on the probability of participating in the ERA study as well as on 
subsequent labour market outcomes.
Despite offering such rich and detailed information, none of the available administrative data 
contain reliable information on education – which thus remains an unobservable in the available 
data, together with ‘innate ability’, discipline or work commitment. The previous literature has, 
however, indicated the potential for detailed labour market histories (like those in the data exploited 
in this report) to help proxy such unobserved traits and thus to eliminate much of the bias due to 
unobservables (see for example, Dolton et al.,	2008;	Heckman	and	Smith,	1999;	Heckman	et al., 
1998;	and	Heckman	et al., 1999).30
4.3.2 Estimating impacts for the non-participants 
Previous work (Goodman and Sianesi, 2007) reviewed in Section 2.2.2 has shown the extent to which 
outcome-relevant observed characteristics X of the participants and non-participants differ.31 One 
could build on that work and calculate experimental impacts by some chosen X, in particular by 
benefit/unemployment history. This would, however, be just an indicative exercise, as it only takes 
account of a chosen subset of the observables. Also, it would not directly provide the overall average 
effect for the eligible population.
To estimate the average effect for the eligible population on administrative outcomes, equation (1a) 
shows that one needs to identify the counterfactual ERA outcome of the non-participants,  
E(Y1 | Q=0).
30 For their main analysis of the NDLP programme, Dolton et al. (2008) rely on the same 
administrative data used in this report. When using a subset of their sample for whom detailed 
additional survey information (including a variety of attitudinal measures) is available, they 
find that such variables in fact add little to the analysis once the lagged outcomes available 
in the main administrative data are controlled for. They interpret this finding as indicative of 
the fact that outcome histories capture these otherwise unobserved factors and supporting of 
their approach based on the selection-on-observables assumption.
31	 Note	that	one	can	test	whether	the	two	groups	significantly	differ	in	terms	of	observables;	one	
can only speculate about whether such observables are likely to affect impacts.
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The methods in this section do so by invoking the ‘selection-on-observables’ assumption that 
participants and non-participants with the same set of observed characteristics would not differ in 
terms of the ERA outcome they experience (or would experience) on average:
 (A1) E(Y1 | Q=0, X) = E(Y1 | Q=1, X)
Assumption (A1) thus requires that for the eligible population, selection into the ERA study is not 
based on unobserved individual characteristics or on unobserved individual ERA impacts.
To give empirical content to assumption (A1), one also needs to assume the existence of common 
support (i.e. overlap in the distribution of observed characteristics X) between participants and non-
participants, so that each non-participant has at least a counterpart in the participant group.
As for implementation, each non-participant is matched to one or more similar programme group 
member(s) based on the propensity score (the probability that an eligible with characteristics 
X participates in the study). This approach is non-parametric in the sense that it allows the ERA 
outcome (and the effect) to depend on observable characteristics in an arbitrary way, as well as for 
eligible individuals to decide to participate in the experiment based on these characteristics.
Sensitivity analysis 
As done for the bounding approach, one can explore how sensitive the estimate of the impact for 
the eligible population is to straightforward violations of assumption (A1) by relaxing it to:
 (A1’) E(Y1 | Q=0, X) = E(Y1 | Q=1, X)
and estimating the impacts that arise from different values of Ө. Assumption (A1’) implies that 
the average ERA outcome that non-participants would have experienced are Ө times the average 
ERA outcome experienced by participants with their same observed characteristics. In other words, 
despite sharing the same observed characteristics, participants and non-participants are allowed 
to differ in terms of some unobservable, which translates into a proportional difference of Ө. As 
the outcomes of interest (employment probability, days employed and earnings) are favourable, 
Ө>1 implies negative selection into the sample participating in ERA (i.e. the non-participants would 
have enjoyed higher employment/earnings outcomes under ERA than actual ERA participants with 
the same observed characteristics, so that those who select or are selected into ERA have below 
average outcome expectation), while Ө<1 positive selection.
4.3.3 Analysis of take-up 
This section outlines a simple yet informative analysis which aims at estimating the type of 
involvement that the non-participants would have had with ERA and more generally with Jobcentre 
Plus had they participated in the evaluation study – either as part of the programme group or of the 
control group. Specifically, this type of analysis aims to answer the following two questions:
1 Are the non-participants individuals who even if offered ERA services would not take them up?
2 What kind of involvement would non-participants have had with Jobcentre Plus had they 
participated in the ERA study and been assigned to the control group? 
One can get a handle on these questions by looking at measures of take-up of services and of 
contact with Jobcentre Plus staff, such as whether the individual has had any type of contact 
with Jobcentre Plus staff, has received help or advice from Jobcentre Plus staff when not working, 
has had an education or training course arranged by Jobcentre Plus staff or, if assigned to the 
programme group, has heard of the employment and of the training bonuses.
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The trick is to simply view such take-up/involvement measures as outcomes, and assess them in 
essentially the same way as done for employment and earnings outcomes.
To answer Question 1, one needs to estimate the take-up of ERA services that non-participants 
would have experienced, on average, had they been offered such services. 
To perform this analysis, the selection-on-observables assumption (A1) is again invoked, which 
requires that, once conditioning on the rich set of observables X, ERA study participants and non-
participants would have taken up the same amount of ERA services on average. In other words, this 
assumption rules out selection into the ERA study based on unobserved characteristics that also 
affect take-up of ERA services once in the programme group.
To implement this estimator, one can match to each non-participant one or more ‘similar’ 
programme group members and take the latter’s reweighted outcomes.
A similar type of analysis can be performed on the non-participants and the control group to answer 
Question 2. It requires that, once conditioning on the observables, ERA study participants and non-
participants would, on average, have had the same involvement with Jobcentre Plus if assigned to 
the control group.
As a final note, although such take-up/involvement measures are obtained from the 12-month 
follow-up survey, non-response to these questions is truly negligible (less than one per cent), so that 
it can be safely ignored when performing both types of exercise.
4.4 Impact estimates under selection on unobservables
The ‘control function models’ are a class of models which allow selection into the group of ERA study 
participants to depend on outcome-relevant unobservables.
These models, which build upon the classical sample selection model introduced by Heckman 
(1979), are framed within a formal set-up and require technical conditions for identification and at 
times quite complex estimation methods. In the following only a few features of this approach are 
thus highlighted, leaving it to Appendix A to provide a more in-depth description.
As always, the key issue is that treatment outcomes are only observed for the participants (as 
represented by the programme group), but are unobserved for the non-participants.
The control function model tries to tackle this issue whilst allowing the unobserved determinant of 
participation to be potentially correlated with unobserved individual characteristics as well as with 
idiosyncratic ERA impacts. The model thus allows for selection into the ERA study based on both 
unobserved characteristics and unobserved individual-specific ERA impacts.
The model crucially relies on an ‘exclusion restriction’ – an observable variable which affects the 
decision to participate in the study, but does not affect potential ERA outcomes directly.
The basic model also imposes that the unobservables are jointly normal and homoskedastic (where 
the latter basically amounts to imposing that the selection process into the ERA study is the same 
for eligible individuals with different observed characteristics). Such parametric assumptions can, 
however,	be	relaxed	and	thus	tested.	For	this	analysis,	both	assumptions	have	in	fact	been	relaxed;	
in addition, the outcome has been allowed to be censored (at zero in the case of employment 
duration or earnings) in both the treatment and no-treatment state.
A convenient feature of these types of models is that they allow one to separately test for selection 
into the ERA study based on unobserved characteristics and based on unobserved individual-specific 
ERA impacts, evidence which can be of interest in its own right.
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Due to the unique set-up of randomisation coupled with administrative outcome measures 
that cover the selected-out (i.e. non-participant) sample as well, one is, however, in the rather 
exceptional position of being able to perform four additional types of tests.
The first two tests exploit the fact that the control group is representative of the participants, but like 
the non-participants does not receive ERA. Thus, for both the controls and the non-participants, the 
actual outcome coincides with the no-treatment outcome, which thanks to administrative data is 
observed for both groups.
1 Testing part of the exclusion restriction of the instrument
The strength (‘power’) of the instrument in affecting the choice among eligible individuals of 
participating in the ERA study is, as usual, a testable condition. In the case of administrative 
outcomes, however, one can assess whether the exclusion restriction holds in terms of non-ERA 
outcomes. Such a test is implemented by pooling the controls and the non-participants, regressing 
observed (no-treatment) outcomes on the observables and the instrument, and testing the 
significance of the instrument. If this shows a significant association between the instrument and 
the outcomes, then it is not a valid instrument – it does not meet the exclusion restriction. 
2 Testing for the presence of residual selection on unobservables related to non-ERA employment 
or earnings outcomes
 One can accomplish this by looking at whether, once controlling for observable characteristics, 
the outcomes of the non-participants differ, on average, from those of control group. If in the 
comparison of the (no-treatment) outcomes of these two groups there remain significant 
differences conditional on observables, this provides evidence of selection on outcome- 
relevant unobservables. 
 The test can be performed by running a regression, on the pooled sample of controls and non-
participants, of observed outcomes on the observables X, plus a dummy variable for whether 
or not the individual participated. If the coefficient on the dummy variable is significant, this 
indicates that there is selection on unobservables.
 The results of this test are not just informative in themselves, but they lend themselves to 
construct an important specification check for any of the control function models. 
Exploiting administrative outcomes, one can construct two specification tests to assess – and order 
– the performance of the different control function models:
3 Testing how well the various control function models capture the presence and direction of the 
selection on unobservables uncovered by test (2)
 The analyst is in the unusual position of being able to choose between different specifications 
of the control function based on how closely a given model matches the difference in adjusted 
observed outcomes between the control group and the non-participants (reflecting the results 
from the test of selection on unobservables).
4 Testing how well the various control function models predict the (observed) non-ERA outcome 
for the non-participants
 One can further choose between different specifications of the control function based on how 
closely a given model matches the average predicted and observed (no-treatment) outcomes of 
the non-participants. 
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5 Implications of non- 
 participation for the four- 
 year experimental impact 
 estimates
This chapter presents the empirical results. The analyses have always been performed separately 
for the two intake groups, New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) and New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+). For all 
estimation methods except the control function models, they have been performed both overall and 
by district. In the following, focus is on the overall findings, with district-level ones being mentioned 
only if worthy of special note. The reader is referred to Appendix B for the tables with all the district-
level results and corresponding summary boxes.
The chapter starts with the benchmark experimental findings that omit the non-participants.
5.1 Experimental findings
This section presents the experimental findings concerning the average impact of Employment 
Retention and Advancement (ERA) for the participants on a series of outcomes measured over 
a four-year follow-up period. Table 5.1 displays both the raw experimental contrast (‘raw’) and 
the impact estimated by linear regression controlling for a number of observed background 
characteristics (‘adjusted’).32 Controlling for such characteristics can increase the precision of the 
experimental impact estimate by reducing the residual variance of the outcome. This seems to 
be largely the case in this application, as the standard errors decrease following the regression 
adjustment. Furthermore, the adjustment allows one to control for differences in observables 
between the programme and the control group that have occurred by chance. Specifically, although 
the programme and control groups can be expected to be more or less identical on average, in 
practice they are very unlikely to be precisely identical – in the same way as with 100 tosses of a 
coin, while one might expect to get around 50 heads, one is in fact very unlikely to get precisely 50 
(the probability of this event being only about 0.08). Regression adjustment allows one to control for 
these chance differences in observables.
A positive effect of ERA on employment outcomes has been uncovered for the ND25+ group, both 
in terms of a 2.8 percentage point increase in the probability of being ever employed during the 
four years after inflow and in terms of a 25-day increase in the time spent in employment over 
that period. These employment effects appear to be driven by impacts in London (+4.1 percentage 
points) and Scotland (+74 days).
No employment impact could, by contrast, be detected for NDLP participants. Although the 
probability of being employed in the 4 follow-up years and days in employment remained 
unaffected overall, interesting impacts have been uncovered at the district level. Specifically, 
participants in North West England enjoyed substantial increases in employment chances (+6.8 
percentage points) and duration (+70 days), while participants in Wales were severely negatively 
affected by a reduction in employment probability of 5.6 percentage points and in employment 
durations of 97 days.
32 Background characteristics have all been derived from the administrative data (see Section 3.3).
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The same overall story was found to apply when assessing the impact of offering ERA on 
participants’ earnings: a significantly positive impact for ND25+ participants and no impact for NDLP 
participants.
In particular, the employment boost received from ERA translated in a substantial rise in earnings 
for the ND25+ programme group, who enjoyed a £1,805 increase cumulatively and an increase of 
between £400 and £560 in each tax year. These earnings impacts were found to be driven first and 
foremost by the district which also enjoyed the most substantial employment boost: Scotland, where 
participants enjoyed a £1,508 increase in earnings in the latest tax year and a remarkable £3,817 
increase cumulatively. The East Midlands contributed to the overall effect on cumulative earnings 
with a £2,662 rise, although in this district the earnings impact in the latest year was insignificant.
The substantial and highly statistically significant ERA impact on earnings for the ND25+ group 
contrasts sharply with the absence of any significant impact for the NDLP group, other than the 
earnings impact in the very early year (2005/06). Indeed, the ERA intervention has significantly 
reduced, by almost £1,600, the earnings in the latest tax year (2008/09) for participants in Scotland.
Table 5.1 Experimental findings over the four-year follow-up period
Raw Adjusted
Effect Std.Err. Effect Std.Err.
ND25+
Ever employed 0.027** 0.013 0.028** 0.012
Days employed 24.6** 11.2 25.0** 10.6
Earnings 2005/06 (£) 4,450** 190 438** 188
Earnings 2006/07 (£) 456** 194 415** 191
Earnings 2007/08 (£) 578*** 213 560*** 210
Earnings 2008/09 (£) 410** 199 392** 195
Earnings 2005–09 (£) 1,894*** 702 1,805*** 687
NDLP
Ever employed -0.002 0.012 -0.008 0.011
Days employed 2.0 14.7 -4.0 13.9
Earnings 2005/06 (£) 420** 176 376** 173
Earnings 2006/07 (£) 260 195 218 192
Earnings 2007/08 (£) 226 214 185 211
Earnings 2008/09 (£) 21 230 -13 227
Earnings 2005–09 (£) 927 737 767 722
Note: Estimates adjusted for the observables X constructed from administrative data for the full sample. 
Robust	standard	errors;	***	significant	at	1%,	**	at	5%,	*	at	10%.
Sample sizes: 6,006 for ND25+ and 5,052 for NDLP.
5.2 Bounds
The bounds analysis aims at bounding the average ERA impact on the eligible population without 
making any assumption on the participation process in the ERA study. This analysis confirms some 
of the four-year experimental findings to be particularly robust to the non-participation issue, in 
particular those relating to a combination of low share of non-participants and large experimental 
estimate, a situation that only applies to within-district results. Specifically, the impact of ERA on the 
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probability of employment of the eligible population is positive in Scotland for ND25+ and in North 
West England for NDLP, while most likely negative in Wales for NDLP. 
Conversely, where the share of non-participants is sizeable and the experimental impact negligible, 
the bounds are very wide. This is indeed the case for the two intake groups overall, for whom the 
impact on the employment probability of those eligible for ERA is bounded between -8 and +15 
percentage points (ND25+) and -23 and +8 percentage points (NDLP). Table 5.2 shows how these 
bounds are derived.
Table 5.2 Derivation of bounds
ND25+ NDLP
(a) Participation rate 0.77 0.70
(b) Non-participants’ employment rate 45 74
(c) Control group’s employment rate 52 76
(d) Programme group’s employment rate 55 76
(e) Experimental impact ATE1 (d-c) 3 0
Bounds for impact on eligibles ATE
Lower bound (a•e) + ((1-a)•(0-b)) -8 -23
Upper bound (a•e) + ((1-a)•(100-b)) 15 8
The sensitivity analysis proved to be often quite informative. Quite in line with the bounds analysis, 
for some districts it gives some clear indication of the effectiveness of ERA for the whole eligible 
population. And indeed, for the ND25+ group overall, the average effect remains positive and 
small under the most scenarios, in contrast to the NDLP group overall, for whom the ATE could be 
negative, positive or zero depending on the type of selection mechanism underlying participation in 
the ERA study (Figure 5.1).
Another interesting finding from the sensitivity analysis is that the type of assumption (i.e. value 
of Ө) required for the experimental impact to be an unbiased estimate of the average effect for 
the full eligible population is different for the two intake groups. In particular, in order to ignore 
non-participation in the NDLP group, one would need to assume a more favourable selection 
into the ERA study than in the case of ND25+. Specifically, for the NDLP group, the experimental 
estimate would recover the average effect under the assumption that the non-participants did 
not select into the ERA study based on ERA outcomes. For the ND25+ group, by contrast, to take 
the experimental impact as representative of the impact on the eligible population, one would 
need to assume that non-participants among the group of eligible ND25+ would have experienced 
much lower employment probabilities had they been offered ERA services than what actual 
participants receiving ERA are observed to experience. Overall, for the experimental estimate to be 
an unbiased estimate for the ATE, the non-participants should have experienced a 14 per cent lower 
employment probability under ERA than does the actual ERA programme group. 
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Figure 5.1 Sensitivity analysis: ATE
Ө
 for ever employed during the four-year   
 follow-up, Ө from 0.5 to 1.5
0.50 0.75
In black: experimental impact estimate and corresponding θ.
As a reminder, a value of 0.5 for θ means that non-participants would be half as likely to achieve 
an outcome if they participated and were in the programme group, as those who actually were 
in the programme group
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5.3 Selection on observables 
This section reports the impact estimates under the assumption that one can observe all outcome-
relevant characteristics that drive selection into the ERA study. 
Table 5.3 presents the matching results for ND25+ and NDLP overall, while Appendix B contains all 
the disaggregated results by district. An overarching comment which applies to the following results 
is that, provided the selection-on-observables assumption is met, the estimates can be viewed as 
very reliable, since the matching exercise has performed extremely well in balancing the observable 
characteristics (see Appendix C).
Starting with the results for the ND25+ group, once differences in observed characteristics between 
participants and non-participants are corrected, the analysis finds that the non-participants would 
have experienced a considerably larger ERA impact on employment outcomes than participants, 
the difference between the two impacts being statistically significant at all levels. In particular, had 
they been offered ERA services, the group of non-participants would have spent 63 days longer in 
employment (significant at the 1% level) during the four follow-up years than if they had not been 
offered ERA. By contrast, participants are found to spend 25 days more in employment (significant 
at the five per cent level) thanks to ERA. The ERA impact on the eligible population is estimated as 
a highly statistically significant 34 days. The same story applies when considering the probability 
of being ever employed during the four years post-inflow: compared to an ERA-led increase for 
participants of 2.8 percentage points (significant at the five per cent level), non-participants would 
have enjoyed a 6.4 and the full eligible population a 3.7 percentage points increase (both impacts 
significant at the one per cent level and statistically different from the impact for participants).
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Table 5.3 Matching four-year impact estimates 
ATE1  ATE0  ATE ATE1 ≠ ATE ATE1 ≠ ATE0
ND25+
Days employed 25.0** 62.5*** 33.6*** ***
Ever employed 0.028** 0.064*** 0.037*** ** **
Earnings 2005/06 (£) 438** 463* 444**
Earnings 2006/07 (£) 415** 819*** 508***
Earnings 2007/08 (£) 560*** 627* 575***
Earnings 2008/09 (£) 392** 482* 413**
Earnings 2005–09 (£) 1,805** 2,392** 1,940***
NDLP 
Days employed -4.0 17.9 2.7
Ever employed -0.008 0.020 0.000 * *
Earnings 2005/06 (£) 376** 550*** 429***
Earnings 2006/07 (£) 218 627*** 342** * *
Earnings 2007/08 (£) 185 525** 289*
Earnings 2008/09 (£) -13 691*** 202 *** ***
Earnings 2005–09 (£) 767 2,393*** 1,262** * *
Notes: 
ATE1	is	the	(experimental)	impact	for	the	participants;	ATE0	is	the	impact	for	the	non-participants;	ATE is the 
impact for all eligibles.
Statistical	significance	based	on	bootstrapped	bias-corrected	confidence	intervals	(1,000	replications);	 
ATE1 ≠ ATE and ATE1 ≠ ATE0: bootstrap-based statistical significance of the difference.
*** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%.
Sample sizes: 7,796 for ND25+ and 7,261 for NDLP.
The finding that ERA employment impacts for the ND25+ non-participants and for the ND25+ 
eligible population would have been consistently better than those experimentally estimated for the 
subgroup of participants point to the possibility that the ND25+ non-participants might in fact be 
easier to help back into the labour market than the average ND25+ entrant. 
As to ERA’s impacts on earnings, the experimental estimate of the impact for ND25+ study 
participants was found to be representative of the average impact for all those eligible for ERA, 
both in terms of the four tax-year earnings post-inflow and in terms of cumulative tax earnings. 
Specifically, the point estimates for the earnings impacts for non-participants as well as for the 
eligible population are always somewhat larger than the corresponding point estimates for 
participants, but such differences never reach any statistical significance.
For the NDLP group, the employment effect in terms of either employment probability or 
employment duration would have been the same – and statistically indistinguishable from zero – for 
the non-participants and for the full eligible group as it was for the experimental group. 
Two districts stand out from this general pattern in terms of employment outcomes: North West 
England and Wales. In North West England ERA was found to enhance participants’ employment (by 
a	weakly	significant	70	days	increase);	non-participants,	however,	are	estimated	to	be	unaffected	by	
ERA (with a negative point estimate), resulting in an ATE for the eligible population slightly smaller 
than the experimental estimate (+58 days) but no longer significant (non-participation in this district 
is only 6%). In Wales by contrast, the situation is reversed: in this district, participants experience 
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significantly fewer days (-97) in employment due to ERA, while non-participants (who represent 
almost half of the eligible population) would not have been significantly affected by the programme 
(indeed the point estimate is positive) and the eligible population would thus have experienced no 
significant adverse ERA impact.
As to ERA’s impacts on earnings for the NDLP group, the evidence in terms of point estimates, their 
statistical significance as well as formal tests of the difference, tells a consistent story: the earnings 
impacts estimated on the experimental group systematically underestimate the average impacts 
that the programme would have had on the non-participants and on the full eligible population. 
Specifically, while ERA failed to significantly increase participants’ cumulative earnings over the four 
post-inflow years (an insignificant £767 point estimate), non-participants would have enjoyed a 
highly significant £2,393 rise in cumulative earnings and the eligible population a significant £1,262 
rise. For the first tax year (2005/06), the point estimates of the impacts for the non-participants 
and for the eligible population are strongly significant and larger than the £376 increase (significant 
only at the five per cent level) estimated for the participants. For the following three tax years, while 
the experimental impact for the participants has dropped in size and become indistinguishable 
from zero, non-participants would have enjoyed a highly significant £500-600 increase in tax-year 
earnings and all those eligible for ERA a mostly significant £200-340 rise. 
In conclusion:
•	 For	the	ND25+	intake	group,	the	experimental	impact	estimate	of	ERA	underestimates	the	
contribution that the programme would have given to all those eligible for ERA in terms of 
improving their employment chances, while it is representative of the expected impact that ERA 
would have had on their earnings. Overall though, the broad story remains unchanged: significant 
impacts on both employment and earnings for the experimental sample as well as for the full 
eligible population.
•	 By	contrast,	for	the	NDLP	group,	the	broad	story	does	change.	In	the	experimental	analysis,	
there is no impact on employment, and only a modest and temporary impact on earnings. After 
allowing for selection on observables, there is still no employment impact for all eligibles, but the 
earnings impact is strengthened, and there is now a significant impact on overall earnings for the 
full eligible population.
5.3.1 Sensitivity analysis
This sensitivity analysis relaxes the selection-on-observables assumption (A1) by allowing 
participants and non-participants with the same observed characteristics to still differ in terms of 
some unobserved dimension – summarised by Ө – that affects their treatment outcome:
 (A1’) E(Y1 | Q=0, X) = Ө E(Y1 | Q=1, X)
Since outcomes of interest are favourable outcomes such as employment probability, days 
employed and earnings, Ө>1 implies negative selection into the sample participating in ERA33, Ө<1 
positive	selection;	while	for	Ө=1, one obviously obtains the matching estimates discussed above.
In line with the bounds analysis in Section 5.2, the sensitivity analysis in Table 5.4 is quite informative 
for the ND25+ group and clearly paints a rather favourable picture for the impact that ERA would 
have had on the eligible population – both in terms of employment and earnings outcomes. 
33 If Ө>1, this means that the non-participants would have enjoyed higher employment/earnings 
outcomes under ERA than actual ERA participants with the same observed characteristics, so 
that those who select or are selected into ERA have below average outcome expectation. 
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In particular, the employment effect of ERA for the eligible group in terms of both the chance of ever 
being employed and the number of days employed would have been positive under all scenarios 
considered bar the most extreme one of Ө=0.5 (corresponding to a situation in which, had they 
received ERA, the non-participants would have experienced half of the employment probability and 
duration than those programme group members with the same observed characteristics). Indeed, 
the impact on earnings outcomes for the eligible population would have been positive under all 
selection scenarios considered.
In contrast to what has been found for the ND25+ group, relaxing assumption (A1) under a number 
of plausible values for Ө does not allow one to say much for the NDLP group, for whom the average 
impact for the eligible population would range from substantial and negative to substantial and 
positive in terms of both employment and earnings outcomes.
Table 5.4 also displays the value of Ө for which the experimental estimate coincides with the 
average impact for the whole eligible population.
An interesting finding is that for both groups and all outcome measures considered there seems to 
be consistency in the value of Ө required for the experimental impact to be an unbiased estimate 
of the average effect for the full eligible population. In particular, such a value is always smaller 
than 1. This means that in order to take the experimental impact as representative of the impact 
on the eligible population, one would need to assume that had they been offered ERA services and 
incentives, the non-participants would have experienced lower employment and earnings outcomes 
than actual programme group members with the same observed characteristics. 
More specifically, in order to ignore non-participation one needs to assume only a slightly favourable 
selection into the ERA study in terms of the two earnings measures for ND25+ and the two 
employment measures for NDLP (the required scenario being that had they received ERA, non-
participants would have experienced 96-97 per cent of the earnings or employment probability 
and duration of observationally equivalent participants). By contrast, one would need to assume 
a stronger positive selection into the ERA study in order to ignore non-participation in terms of 
employment duration for ND25+ and earnings in the latest tax year for NDLP (non-participants being 
required to experience under ERA only 86-87 per cent of the employment duration and earnings 
enjoyed by those programme group members with their same observed characteristics).
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Table 5.4 Sensitivity analysis: ATE
Ө
, Ө from 0.5 to 1.5
Ever employed Days employed Earnings 2008/09
Earnings 2005/06–
2008/09
Ө ATE
Ө
Ө ATE
Ө
Ө ATE
Ө
Ө ATE
Ө
ND25+
0.50 -0.022 0.50 -0.5 0.50 21 0.50 411
0.75 0.007 0.75 16.6 0.75 217 0.75 1,176
0.93 0.028 0.87 25.0 0.97 392 0.96 1,805
1.00 0.037 1.00 33.6 1.00 413 1.00 1,940
1.25 0.066 1.25 50.6 1.25 609 1.25 2,704
1.50 0.095 1.50 67.7 1.50 805 1.50 3,468
NDLP
0.50 -0.116 0.50 -88.2 0.50 -564 0.50 -1,500
0.75 -0.058 0.75 -42.8 0.75 -181 0.75 -113
0.96 -0.008 0.96 -4.0 0.86 -13 0.91 767
1.00 0.000 1.00 2.7 1.00 202 1.00 1,262
1.25 0.058 1.25 48.1 1.25 584 1.25 2,636
1.50 (1) 1.50 94 1.50 967 1.50 4,011
In bold: experimental impact estimate and corresponding Ө.
(1) With 76% of the NDLP programme group having been employed at some time during the subsequent 4 
years, a value of Ө of 1.5 would imply an employment rate for non-participants above 100%, so this entry is 
left blank.
Sample sizes: 7,796 for ND25+ and 7,261 for NDLP.
5.3.2 Analysis of take-up
Although as argued in Section 2.4, an analysis of the effect of ERA eligibility would need to 
include the non-participants irrespective of their potential take-up of the programme, it is still very 
interesting to know the type of involvement they would have had with ERA – and more generally 
with Jobcentre Plus – had they participated in the evaluation study, either as part of the programme 
group or of the control group. 
Table 5.5 presents the results of these analyses in terms of a number of measures of take-up of 
services and of contact with Jobcentre Plus staff within the first year since inflow:
•	 measures	of	presence,	type	and	intensity	of	contact	with	Jobcentre	Plus	staff	(any	contact,	the	
individual has initiated face-to-face visits, very intense contact in the form of ten or more face-to-
face	meetings);	
•	 measures	of	help	or	advice	received	from	Jobcentre	Plus	staff	when	the	individual	was	not	
working (staff offered any help/advice, performed a Better Off Calculation, suggested individual 
attends a Jobclub/Programme Centre, arranged an education or training course, offered advice 
without	being	requested);
•	 measures	of	the	individual’s	assessment	of	the	advice	received;	and
•	 for	the	programme	group	analysis	only,	measures	directly	linked	to	knowledge	of	ERA	features	
(whether the individual has heard of the employment and the training bonuses).
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Recall from Section 4.3 that all results hinge on the assumption that there is no selection into 
the ERA study based on unobserved characteristics that also affect take-up of ERA services or 
involvement with Jobcentre Plus if participating in the study. Subject to this proviso, the findings 
provide interesting evidence on the two sets of questions considered.
First, the analysis estimates the take-up that the non-participants would have exhibited in their first 
year had they been assigned to the programme group. Are the non-participants individuals who even 
if offered ERA services would not take them up? And could this be the underlying reason for Jobcentre 
Plus caseworkers not offering them the chance to participate in the randomisation in the first place, 
or, for those who were offered such a chance, the reason driving their own refusal to participate in 
the demonstration? If this is the case, one might argue that even if ERA became an official policy, 
they would not be interested in effectively taking up the support and incentives it offers.34
For the ND25+ group, there are statistically significant differences between the non-participants and 
the programme group in two measures of involvement with Jobcentre Plus staff and in terms of 
awareness of the ERA bonuses, but such differences are not striking. Specifically, while in their first 
year on ERA 85 per cent of the programme group has received help or advice from Jobcentre Plus 
staff while not working, the model predicts that 82.5 per cent of the non-participants would have 
received such help had they been assigned to the programme group. Similarly, the non-participants 
would have a two percentage point lower likelihood than the programme group of being offered 
help by staff without being requested. Non-participants would also have been less aware of the 
bonuses than the actual programme group is (72.9 per cent rather than 75.4 per cent for the 
employment bonus and 40.1 per cent rather than 43 per cent for the training bonus). 
Overall, had they been randomised into the programme, the ND25+ non-participants would have 
been quite heavily involved with ERA and Jobcentre Plus in their first year. And although they 
would have been statistically significantly less aware of ERA features and would have experienced 
slightly less contact than the actual programme group, such differences are arguably small from a 
substantive point of view.
The conjecture that if the programme became official, non-participants would be mostly 
uninterested in taking up its support and incentives finds no strong support for the NDLP group 
either. In fact, had they become eligible to ERA services and incentives, in their first year the non-
participants would have been over 3 percentage points more likely than the programme group to 
be involved in training and education activities arranged by Jobcentre Plus, as well as more likely to 
be directed to a Jobclub or Programme Centre. The two groups are not found to differ significantly 
in any other measure of awareness and involvement, with the notable exception of the likelihood 
of receiving help or advice from Jobcentre Plus when not working. As was the case for ND25+, it is 
again the programme group which is 2.4 percentage points more likely to receive such help than the 
non-participants. As many as 75 per cent of the latter are, however, still predicted to receive such 
support when out of work.
The second question concerns the kind of involvement that non-participants would have had with 
Jobcentre Plus had they participated in the ERA study and been assigned to the control group. 
Among the reasons that the qualitative research has highlighted for ND25+ entrants to formally 
refuse to participate, there was a feeling of being close to getting a job in the near future and not 
wanting to stay in touch with Jobcentre Plus, or a strong antipathy to government and systems 
of support and governance. The question thus arises of whether the ND25+ non-participant 
34 Again, note that if some eligible individuals are not fully informed about ERA or do not 
otherwise avail themselves of its services, they will dilute the effect of ERA eligibility on the 
eligible population.
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group is made up of individuals who would shun involvement with Jobcentre Plus at all costs. 
This supposition is not borne out in the data: had they been assigned to the control group, the 
involvement that the ND25+ non-participants would have had with Jobcentre Plus in their first year 
would not have been statistically different from the one displayed by the actual control group in any 
of the dimensions considered.
As opposed to ND25+, NDLP entrants were easy to recruit to the ERA study once having been offered 
the chance to participate in it. In fact, most (87 per cent) of the non-participants amongst the NDLP 
group were diverted customers. One might thus conjecture that had they been offered the chance 
to participate, the NDLP non-participants would in fact have been quite involved with Jobcentre Plus 
even if assigned to the control group. According to the results in Table 5.5, this seems to be the case. 
Indeed, it is estimated that compared to the control group, NDLP non-participants would have had 
the same type and intensity of involvement with Jobcentre Plus staff, while being four percentage 
points more likely to rate their advice as very helpful. 
Overall, the share of the eligible population that has been excluded (i.e. the diverted customers) or 
has formally refused to take part in the ERA study displays observed characteristics that make them 
quite likely to be involved with Jobcentre Plus generally, both with and without ERA.
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5.4 Selection on unobservables 
Before presenting and discussing, in Section 5.4.2, the findings from the different control function 
models that have been estimated, Section 5.4.1 reports the results from testing for selection in 
terms of no-treatment unobservables and presenting the chosen instrument together with evidence 
on its power and validity.
5.4.1 Testing for selection on specific unobservables 
Section 4.4 suggested a simple way to test for the presence of residual selection into the ERA study 
based on unobservables related to no-treatment employment and earnings outcomes. Specifically, 
this involves assessing whether, once controlling for observable characteristics, the non-ERA 
outcomes of the participants (as represented by the control group) differ, on average, from those of 
the non-participants.
Table 5.6 reports the results of this test, which for robustness was carried out via simple Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS), fully interacted regression (FILM), matching and Tobit or Probit. Simple OLS 
regression can suffer from misspecification bias if observed characteristics affect the outcome in a 
non-linear fashion and/or affect the way in which the control group differs from the non-participants 
in terms of outcomes. A fully interacted linear model (FILM) relaxes the latter restriction, while 
non-parametric matching relaxes both. Furthermore, OLS regression (simple or interacted) does not 
take into account the potentially censored or binary nature of the outcome variable. Tobit and Probit 
models take account of, respectively, censoring and a binary outcome variable, but do so based on a 
distributional assumption.
Interestingly, non-participants are found to be subject to the same type of selection on 
unobservables in both intake groups.
In terms of four-year employment outcomes and with weak evidence in terms of earnings, non-
participants have unobservables leading them to experience worse (non-ERA) outcomes than 
observationally similar participants. Specifically, compared to participants with the same observed 
characteristics, ND25+ and NDLP non-participants:
•	 are	three	to	four	percentage	points	less	likely	to	have	been	ever	employed	and	have	spent	around	
40	fewer	days	in	employment	in	the	four	years	post-inflow;	and	
•	 earned	roughly	£400	less	in	2008/09	and	around	£1,000	less	between	2005	and	2009	(according	
to Tobit only and then significant at the ten per cent level).
While the selection story that emerged is the same for both intake groups, this overall result was 
found to be driven by different districts within the two groups. 
For the ND25+ intake group, adverse selection in terms of employment was found in East Midlands, 
North	East	England,	Wales	and	London;	adverse	selection	in	terms	of	earnings	was	found	in	North	
East	England	only;	and	no	selection	on	unobservables	was	found	to	have	taken	place	for	ND25+	
non-participants in North West England and Scotland. 
For the NDLP group, non-participants in Wales, Scotland and possibly East Midlands have unobservables 
that	caused	them	to	experience	worse	employment	outcomes	than	the	participants;	non-participants	
in	Scotland	and	Wales	experienced	lower	earnings;	non-participants	in	London	and	North	East	England	
have	not	been	subject	to	any	residual	selection	on	unobservables;	and	non-participants	in	North	West	
England have indeed been subject to favourable selection, experiencing better employment and 
possibly better earnings outcomes than observationally equivalent participants.
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Table 5.6 Differences in outcomes for participants (control group) compared to 
 non-participants with the same observed characteristics during the 
 four-year follow-up
 
Outcome Method α Given observables, participants: 
ND25
Days employed OLS
FILM
Matching
Tobit
50***
34**
37***
45***
spend more days employed 
Ever employed OLS
FILM
Matching
Probit
0.042***
0.026
0.033*
0.050***
are more likely to be employed 
Earnings 2008/09 OLS
FILM
Matching
Tobit
330
72
103
385**
do not earn more in 2008/09 
(except according to Tobit)
Earnings 2005–09 OLS
FILM
Matching
Tobit
972
138
163
1,210*
do not earn more between 
2005/06 and 2008/09 (except 
weak Tobit evidence)
NDLP
Days employed OLS
FILM
Matching
Tobit
35**
26
24
40**
spend more days employed 
Ever employed OLS
FILM
Matching
Probit
0.035***
0.027*
0.031*
0.035***
are more likely to be employed 
Earnings 2008/09 OLS
FILM
Matching
Tobit
379
416
326
428*
do not earn more in 2008/09 
(except weak Tobit evidence)
Earnings 2005–09 OLS
FILM
Matching
Tobit
1,196
1,201
741
982*
do not earn more between 
2005/06 and 2008/09 (except 
weak Tobit evidence)
Significance based on robust standard errors for OLS and FILM, and on approximate standard errors for kernel 
matching. ***: significant at 1%,**: at 5%, *: at 10%.
Sample sizes: 4,755 for ND25+ and 4,702 for NDLP.
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In conclusion, though, when selection on unobservables has been uncovered, the picture that 
emerges during the four-year follow-up period is one of worse employment outcomes and possibly 
lower earnings for the non-participants. Non-participants, thus, seem to be less attached to the 
labour market – experiencing shorter employment durations, smaller incidence of employment and 
(hence?) somewhat lower earnings. The unobservables characterising the non-participants might 
thus relate to those more on the fringe of the labour market.
Before concluding this section it is important to note that even if the data has failed to pass this 
test in terms especially of employment outcomes, this would not per se invalidate the matching 
estimates of the impacts for the non-participants and for the eligible population which rely on 
the selection-on-observables assumption (Section 5.3). Even if after controlling for observable 
differences, control group participants have significantly different outcomes from the non-
participants, this only relates to the no-treatment outcome. With administrative outcomes being 
available for all those eligible for ERA, the matching methods do not need to predict the no-
treatment outcome, as these are observed. Matching methods by contrast need to predict the 
average treatment outcome for the non-participants, and do so using observably similar programme 
group members.
5.4.2 Control function results as a sensitivity check
Before discussing the results from the extensive search for an appropriate control function model to 
take account of the residual selection uncovered in Section 5.4.1, it is helpful to remind readers of 
the key terminology:
an instrument is an observable factor which is found to affect the probability of participating in ERA, 
but	does	not	directly	affect	ERA	outcomes;
the exclusion restriction is the second part of the above definition – that there is no effect on the 
outcomes	in	question;
the power of the instrument relates to the first part of the definition – the extent to which the 
instrument	affects	ERA	participation;	the	greater	this	is,	the	more	precise	the	results.
Defending the choice of instrument and presenting evidence on its power and validity is crucial, as 
without a sensible and strong instrument, no control function model could be robustly identified.
Motivated by the idea that for both intake groups the observed fall over time in non-participation 
rates is likely to reflect increased adviser experience and confidence in selling ERA, as well as the 
permission to mention ERA financial incentives (see Goodman and Sianesi, 2007), a promising 
instrument would be the elapsed number of days since random assignment started in an 
individual’s district and for that individual’s intake group. This measure is thus relative to random 
assignment start in each district and for each New Deal intake group, and is conditional on 
controlling for calendar time using three dummies for five-month periods.35
This instrument-based on the increased persuasiveness of the advisers and the greater promotion 
of the ERA bonuses does indeed look like a very promising one, both in terms of its relevance and 
validity (see Appendix C). Specifically, for both intake groups it displays a very powerful first stage 
35 Originally the authors had explored the possibility of using a series of individual office 
dummies, within district and controlling for important local and office characteristics such 
as travel-to-work-level unemployment rate, local index of multiple deprivation, total New 
Deal caseload at that office and share of lone parents in New Deal caseload at that office. 
Interestingly, this instrument does not pass the exclusion restriction test.
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(that is, it greatly contributes in explaining whether an eligible individual participates in the ERA 
study or not) and it passes the exclusion restriction test in terms of non-ERA outcomes at any 
significance level.36
Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 present the findings from the four types of control function models that 
have been implemented: the standard model, a model where independence of the observables and 
the error terms is relaxed, a model where normality of the unobservables is relaxed, and a control 
function model embedded in a Tobit model to explicitly take account of censoring in the outcome 
variable. For the first three models different estimations have been performed, including non-linear 
and interaction terms in the first-stage Probit (‘interactions’) or not (‘no interactions’).
To preview the conclusions on this part of the analysis, the strong demands placed on the data to 
identify and estimate the various models in a robust way have proved difficult to meet. Several of 
the models failed to pass the strict specification tests, and often provided very noisy and unstable 
estimates. Nonetheless, the results that have emerged can be viewed as useful sensitivity checks 
that have indeed mostly corroborated the evidence emerging from the analysis based on controlling 
only for observables (Section 5.3).
Specifically, for the ND25+ intake group, six out of seven of the control function models for 
employment (Table A.1) do not uncover any significant selection on unobservables, and the one 
which does confirms the previous finding that for employment outcomes, the experimental impact 
significantly underestimates the impact for the non-participants and indeed for the eligible population.
As for cumulative earnings (Table A.3), the control function model fails to detect any significant 
selection on unobservables, as well as any significant difference between the impact for participants 
on one hand, and the impacts for the eligible population and for non-participants on the other. As 
was the case for the selection-on-observables findings, the point estimates (and their significance) 
indicate a possibly larger impact for the latter two subgroups, though, as mentioned, such 
differences never reach statistical significance.
36 One caveat concerns the – untestable – part of the exclusion restriction which relates to ERA 
outcomes. If there were a relationship between becoming more persuasive in convincing 
people to participate in the ERA study and helping them in the labour market, the instrument 
would not be a valid one. It has to be kept in mind though that no such relationship was 
detected	in	terms	of	non-ERA	outcomes;	in	this	case,	(New	Deal)	advisers	becoming	more	
persuasive in getting people into the study did not become more helpful for the controls. 
Finally, a strong factor driving the instrument is the permission for advisers to mention ERA’s 
bonuses, which is arguably random.
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For the NDLP group, all employment models (Table A.2) fail to detect any significant residual 
selection on unobservables and all models but two confirm the findings in Section 5.3 that the 
four-year experimental impact is representative of the impact that the full eligible population 
would have experienced, on average, had they been offered ERA services and incentives.37 Since 
the models detect no significant selection, the results of the models suggesting increased impacts 
should not be given too much weight – but it is nevertheless reassuring that they do show the 
same direction of difference. For the earnings outcome (Table A.3), the control function model does 
uncover weak evidence of selection on unobservables and points to estimates for the impact on the 
non-participants (and hence, on the eligible population) many times larger than the experimental 
estimate. However, none of these three estimates is statistically significant, and neither are the 
differences in impacts between participants and the other two subgroups. This model also fails to 
pass all of the five specification tests, which means that its findings have to be viewed as indicative 
at best.
37 Two models for employment do find significant differences between the experimental impact 
and the impacts for participants and for the eligible population despite the absence of evidence 
of selection on unobservables. The estimated impacts for the non-participants appear, 
however, implausibly large. The average effect for the eligible group is correspondingly large 
and significant. These large effects easily become statistically different from the zero effect for 
participants. These two models, thus, seem to imply that the experimental effect on employment 
underestimates the impact for the non-participants and for the eligible population. Such findings 
should, however, be interpreted with extreme care, especially given how inadequately one of the 
models (the censored model) performs in terms of the two criteria.
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6 Summary and conclusions
6.1 Drawing the findings together
This concluding section starts by drawing together the findings from the different types of analyses 
that have been performed, the results of which are summarised in Table 6.1 for the two intake groups.
•	 The	issue	of	non-participation	is	potentially	a	serious	one,	both	given	the	extent	of	non-
participation (with over one-quarter of the eligible population not participating in the Employment 
Retention and Advancement ERA study) and given important selective differences between study 
participants and non-participants.
•	 In	the	absence	of	ERA,	the	study	participants	of	both	the	New	Deal	for	Lone	Parents	(NDLP)	
and New Deal 25 Plus (ND25+) groups experience better employment outcomes – and possibly 
somewhat higher earnings – over the four-year follow-up period than non-participants with the 
same observable characteristics, including extensive labour market histories. The adviser- and 
self-selected individuals making up the group of the non-participants are, thus, characterised by 
unobservable factors that make them, on average, more detached from the labour market.
•	 This	study	has	extensively	explored	whether,	and	how	much,	the	experimental	impacts	in	the	four	
years since inflow into the New Deal are representative of the potential impact of offering ERA 
services and incentives to the entire population of New Deal entrants, that is, to the full group of 
those eligible for ERA, in the six evaluation districts.
•	 This	has	necessarily	involved	invoking	a	number	of	suitable	assumptions	and	using	a	range	of	
techniques to estimate the likely impact that the non-participants would have experienced, on 
average, had they participated in ERA. 
•	 Based	on	extensive	diagnostic	and	specification	tests,	as	well	as	on	contrasting	and	cross-
checking the findings and evidence from the different methodological approaches, the story that 
emerges appears to be quite different for the ND25+ and NDLP groups and across outcomes.
6.1.1 ND25+ group
•	 If	all	those	eligible	to	take	part	in	the	ERA	study	had	done	so,	the	employment effects of ERA 
in the four years since programme start would have been significantly higher. In particular, 
the effect on employment probability from the experimental analysis which ignores the non-
participants is a significant underestimate of the impact that the full eligible population would 
have experienced. 
•	 This result is driven by the fact that the employment impact for the non-participants would 
have been considerably larger than the one for the participants. Compared to a 2.8 percentage 
point increase on the probability of being ever employed over the four-year period found for the 
participants, the non-participants would have enjoyed a 6.4 percentage point increase, and all those 
eligible for ERA a 3.7 percentage point increase, with both impacts for the non-participants and for 
the eligibles being statistically significantly different from the impact enjoyed by the participants. 
 Similarly, compared to an increase in employment duration over the four-year period of 25 days 
found for the experimental sample of participants, the non-participants would have enjoyed a  
63-day increase, and all those eligible for ERA a 34-day increase.
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•	 As	the	non-participants	were	found	to	be	more	detached	from	the	labour	market	–	experiencing	
worse employment outcomes and at times lower earnings – these findings might indicate that for 
these more labour-market detached ND25+ entrants some extra help in the form of advice and 
financial incentives might be particularly helpful in improving their labour market situation.
•	 By contrast, the four-year experimental estimates of the impact for study participants are 
representative of the average impact that the eligible population would have experienced in terms 
of earnings, as measured by the four tax-year earnings post New Deal entry and by cumulative 
2005–09 tax earnings. Specifically, the point estimates for the earnings impacts for non-
participants as well as for the full eligible population are always larger than the corresponding point 
estimates for participants, but such differences are far from reaching any statistical significance.
6.1.2 NDLP group
•	 The	experimental	impact	estimates	of	employment outcomes in the four years post-inflow 
are found to be representative of the average impact that ERA would have had on its eligible 
population. Specifically, no significant impact was found for the experimental sample on either 
employment duration or the probability of being employed during the four-year follow-up period, 
and the absence of any significant impact extends to the non-participants, and hence, to the 
eligible population. Again, it is worth noting, however, that the point estimates for the eligible 
population and especially for the non-participants are higher and in positive territory compared to 
the (insignificant but) negative ones for participants.
•	 By	contrast,	if	all	those	eligible	for	ERA	had	taken	part,	the	earnings impacts for the NDLP group 
would have been higher. In other words, excluding the non-participants from the analysis 
significantly underestimates the impact that ERA would have had on the average earnings of all 
those eligible for ERA. This is the case for earnings in the 2006/07 and 2008/09 tax years as well 
as for cumulative earnings (the point estimates for the non-participants are strongly significant 
and larger than the ones for participants in the other two fiscal years as well). Specifically, while 
ERA has not significantly increased participants’ cumulative earnings over the follow-up period 
(an insignificant £767 point estimate), non-participants would have enjoyed a highly significant 
£2,393 rise in cumulative earnings and the eligible population a significant £1,262 rise, where the 
impacts for the non-participants and for the eligibles are statistically significantly different from 
the impact for the participants.
In conclusion, for both New Deal groups and in terms of all outcomes considered, non-
participants would have enjoyed uniformly higher ERA impacts than do participants. Only for 
ND25+ employment and NDLP earnings outcomes do, however, such differences reach statistical 
significance and indeed, extend to significant differences between impacts for study participants 
and impacts for the full eligible population. 
•	 How	do	these	results	four	years	after	inflow	compare	with	the	previous	findings	by	Sianesi	(2010)	
relating to the first year? 
– As can be seen from Box 6.1, the story has remained the same at one and four years after 
inflow for employment outcomes: the experimental impact underestimates the impact for the 
non-participants and for the eligible population for the ND25+ group, while the absence of any 
experimental impact for NDLP participants would extend to the non-participants and to the 
eligible population. 
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– By contrast, the story has changed in terms of earnings, notably with the finding that four 
years post-New Deal start, the experimental impact on NDLP participants is no longer 
representative of (and would indeed underestimate) the impact on non-participants and on  
the eligible population.
 It has to be noted that the previous report could only use earnings outcomes collected from the 
first-wave survey of a sample of ERA participants, while the current report was able to exploit 
administrative earnings data on all those eligible for ERA. Despite the fact that these data 
were measured differently and for different samples (the latter requiring the use of a different 
methodology to identify and estimate impacts), the findings in the first year since inflow 
reassuringly coincide. Specifically, both in terms of survey earnings measures from the previous 
report and in terms of administrative earnings measures from the current one, the positive 
impact on earnings estimated for the NDLP participants was found to be representative of the 
impact that the non-participants and the full eligible population would have experienced under 
ERA in their first year since inflow. Similarly for the ND25+ group, first-year earnings impacts 
from both survey measures, ignoring non-response and from administrative data, point to the 
experimental estimates being representative of the impact on the full eligible population.
Box 6.1 Summary of year-one results 
ND25+ NDLP
Employment
Participants none;	+4.6	days No impact for participants, non-participants 
and eligible population
Non-participants +5.6pp;	+10	days
Eligible group +2.6pp;	+5.8	days
Experimental impact underestimates the effect for the 
eligible population
Experimental impact is representative of the 
effect for the eligible population (i.e. none)
Earnings
Impact for the responding participants is representative of 
(possibly underestimates when allowing for non-response) 
the effect for the full eligible population
Impact for the responding participants is 
representative of the impact for the full eligible 
population
Notes: 
Employment outcomes are the probability of having ever been employed during the 12 months since inflow 
and the number of days employed during the 12 months since inflow.
Earnings are total yearly earnings in the 12 months since random assignment and are taken from the  
first-wave survey of a sample of ERA participants.
For the full set of results and their in-depth discussion, see Sianesi (2010).
•	 Finally,	no	support	has	been	found	for	the	conjecture	that	had	the	non-participants	been	offered	
ERA, they would have been mostly uninterested in effectively taking up its support and incentives. 
In fact, the results show that for both intake groups overall, those eligible for ERA who have been 
excluded or have formally refused to take part in the ERA study, display observed characteristics 
that make them quite likely to be involved with ERA and with Jobcentre Plus in the first year since 
inflow. Specifically, had they been randomised into the programme, the non-participants would 
have been less aware of ERA or less involved with staff than the programme group only in terms 
of a couple of measures, and then only marginally. Indeed, had they become eligible for ERA 
services and incentives, the NDLP non-participants would have been over three percentage points 
more likely than the programme group to be involved in training or education activities arranged 
by Jobcentre Plus, as well as more likely to be directed to a Jobclub or Programme Centre in 
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their first year. Had they been randomised into the control group, NDLP non-participants would 
have been four percentage points more likely than the actual control group to rate advice from 
Jobcentre Plus staff as very helpful. 
6.2 Conclusions
The picture that emerged from the interim four-year experimental findings is that ERA has not been 
effective in improving the employment and earnings outcomes of NDLP participants in the four-year 
follow-up period, but that the intervention has significantly improved both types of outcomes for 
ND25+ participants.38 How has the presence of the non-participants affected the representativeness 
(or external validity) of the experimental impact estimates?
In the descriptive examination of the non-participation problem by Goodman and Sianesi (2007), it 
had been speculated that it would be hard for the non-participants to give rise to an estimate for the 
eligible population that tells a different ‘story’ from the one arising from the experimental estimate 
–	where	the	story	could	be	one	among:	ERA	is	harmful;	it	has	basically	no	effect;	it	has	a	‘relatively	
small’	effect;	or	it	has	a	‘relatively	large’	effect	(whatever	one	may	mean	by	‘relatively	large’	or	
‘relatively small’). 
The findings in this report have, however, proved this previous supposition partly wrong. 
Indeed, the report has found that the picture emerging from the four-year findings on ERA at times 
does change, painting a more favourable picture of the effectiveness that the ERA intervention 
would have had on its full eligible population. 
This is the case in terms of employment chances for the ND25+ group and especially in terms of 
earnings for the NDLP group. In both of these instances, the experimental impact estimates for the 
participants underestimate the gains that the eligible population would have enjoyed had it been 
offered ERA services and incentives. 
For the ND25+ group, the experimental 2.8 percentage point increase in employment probability 
and 25 day increase in employment duration for the participants underestimate the likely impact 
that ERA would have had on all ND25+ entrants by almost one percentage point and ten days. Of 
even more substance is the fact that for the NDLP experimental group no ERA impact was found 
on earnings beyond the first year, whereas the earnings impact that ERA would have been likely to 
have had on all NDLP entrants remains significant in most subsequent years and totals a statistically 
significant £1,262 gain cumulatively.
For other combinations of outcomes and intake groups, the picture emerging from the four-year 
findings on ERA remains completely unchanged. In particular, the four-year experimental results 
of a substantial increase in ND25+ earnings and of no change in NDLP employment appear to 
generalise to the full eligible population. 
Overall, the representativeness/external validity of the experimental impact estimates was, thus, 
found to depend on the intake group and outcome considered. As outlined, for ND25+ employment 
and NDLP earnings, evidence of non-participation bias (or of some loss in external validity) has been 
uncovered. 
Of course, there is always the issue of how different the estimates for the eligible population and 
for the experimental sample need to be for one to view the issue as a particularly important one. 
38 A full ERA evaluation report looking at the five-year impacts, as well as at the costs and 
benefits associated with the programme will be published by the Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP) during spring 2011.
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Randomised experiments are, however, conceptually designed to provide, with accuracy, the ‘true’ 
answer to the evaluation question. Hence, an effect for the eligible population which is over one-
third larger than the experimental estimate or indeed a large, significant impact for the eligible 
population that surfaces when none was found experimentally, can be viewed as findings of 
substance.
This report has not only extensively assessed the external validity of the four-year ERA findings, but 
it has set the foundation work and developed a sound and thorough methodological framework for 
the analysis of non-participation in experimental studies. Given that in many evaluation settings 
the problem of non-participation is an empirically relevant one (see, for example, Kamionka and 
Lacroix, 2005), the framework developed in this report can be applied to assessing this issue in any 
study which can exploit the three critical features of: 1) being interested in assessing the impact of 
offering	a	new	treatment;	(2)	eligible	for	this	offer	under	an	official	policy	would	be	a	well-defined	
population;	(3)	for	whom	background	(and	ideally,	outcome)	information	is	recorded	in	the	available	
data.
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Appendix A  
Control function: Methods  
and results
A.1 Impact estimates under selection on unobservables
This appendix sketches a class of models which allow selection into the group of Employment 
Retention and Advancement (ERA) study participants to depend on outcome-relevant 
unobservables. All of these models fall within the family of ‘control function models’ and build 
upon the classical sample selection model introduced by Heckman (1979). The current set-up with 
administrative outcomes, however, places the analyst in the rather unique position of being able to 
observe the outcomes of the selected-out sample. Together with randomisation, this feature of the 
data is exploited to test: 
(a)	part	of	the	exclusion	restriction	of	the	instrument;
(b) for the presence of residual selection on unobservables related to no-treatment employment or 
earnings	outcomes;
(c) how well the various control function models capture the presence and direction of the selection 
on	unobservables	that	has	thus	been	uncovered;	and
(d) how well the various control function models predict the no-treatment outcome for the 
non-participants.
Tests (a) and (b) of course apply irrespective of the actual control function model being considered. 
By contrast, tests (c) and (d) test some features of the performance of a given model, so that 
their specific form depends on the actual model under examination. The section, thus, starts by 
presenting tests (a) and (b), then moves on to sketch the various models, outlining the idea behind 
tests (c) and (d).
A.1.1 Some initial tests 
The following two tests exploit the fact that the control group is representative of the participants, 
but like the non-participants does not receive ERA. Thus, for both the controls and the non-
participants, the actual outcome coincides with the no-treatment outcome, and in the case of 
administrative data is observed for both groups.
The general control function approach attempts to control for selection into the ERA study based 
on unobservables by exploiting some arguably exogenous variation in participation by way of a 
so-called ‘excluded instrument’. Specifically, one needs an observable variable Z which affects the 
decision to participate in the ERA study, but it does not otherwise affect potential outcomes directly. 
In symbols, Z has to be such that:
(CF) (a) P(Q=1 | X, Z) is a non-trivial function of Z
 (b) E(Y1 | X, Z) = E(Y1 | X)
The strength (‘power’) of the instrument in affecting the choice among eligible individuals to 
participate in the ERA study, i.e. condition (CF.a), is, as usual, a testable condition. In this case, 
however, of modelling administrative outcomes one can test part of the exclusion restriction as 
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well (condition CF.b), specifically one can test whether this condition holds in terms of non-ERA 
outcomes, i.e. whether E(Y0 | X, Z) = E(Y0 | X). Such a test is implemented by pooling the controls and 
the non-participants, regressing observed (no-treatment) outcomes on the observables and the 
instrument, and testing the significance of the instrument. 
Due to this unique set-up, one is also in a position to test whether there remain differences between 
participants and non-participants in terms of unobservables related to non-ERA employment or 
earnings outcomes. This can be accomplished by looking at whether, once controlling for observable 
characteristics, the outcomes of the non-participants differ, on average, from those of control group. 
If in the comparison of the (no-treatment) outcomes of these two groups there remain significant 
differences conditional on observables, this provides evidence of selection on outcome-relevant 
unobservables.39 This test can be performed by running a regression on the pooled sample of 
controls and non-participants of observed outcomes Y on the group dummy variable G controlling 
for observables X, and testing the significance of α:
Y = αG + γX + ε
A number of alternative methods are also available to minimise all sensitivity to the specification 
of how the observables should enter the outcome equation or affect differences between the two 
groups (matching and fully interacted OLS models), as well as to properly take into account the 
potentially binary or censored nature of the outcome of interest (Probit and Tobit models).
The results of this test are not just informative in themselves, but as shown below, they lend 
themselves to construction of an important specification check for any of the control function models. 
A.1.2 Standard control function model 
The problem of non-participation in the ERA study is akin to the classical sample selection problem: 
the treatment outcome is only observed for the ERA study participants (indeed, for its representative 
programme subgroup), but is not observed for the non-participants.
This is a rather formal set-up, requiring technical conditions for identification and at times quite 
complex estimation methods. The description provides the least detail which is necessary to 
appreciate the assumptions underlying the estimates and to interpret the output presented below.
For the eligible population, potential treatment (Y1) and no-treatment (Y0) outcomes depend on 
observed (X) and unobserved (u) individual characteristics and on unobserved individual ERA impacts 
(b) as follows:
Y0 = β0X + u   u ~ N(0, σu
2)  
Y1 = β1X + u + b  b ~ N(0, σb
2)  
As mentioned, treatment outcomes Y1 are however only observed for study participants (Q=1, as 
represented by the programme group), not for the non-participants (Q=0). Let the observability rule 
for Y1 be:
39 A crucial assumption underpinning this statement is that there has been no ERA impact on 
the control group. This is a fundamental assumption for the validity of the experimental 
impact estimates, which is likely to have been met given that control group members were not 
allocated a dedicated post-employment advisor nor could they receive the financial incentives. 
Furthermore, the qualitative evaluation found no evidence to support the possibility that the 
process of holding out the chance to become eligible to substantial financial bonuses and then 
informing the controls that they would not in fact be eligible may have had some impact on 
their motivation and subsequent actions.
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Q = 1 if γW + v ≥0  v ~ N(0, 1)
Q = 0 if γW + v <0 
where the observables W are made up of the observed characteristics X as well as by some 
‘instrument’ Z, and where the unobserved determinant of participation in the ERA study, v, is 
potentially correlated with unobserved individual characteristics (u) and ERA impacts (b):
Corr(v, u) = ρuv 
Corr(v, b) = ρbv
The model thus allows for selection into the ERA study based on both unobserved ‘ability’ (u) and 
unobserved individual-specific ERA impacts (b).
The crucial set of assumptions implicit in this model is: 
(CF) (a)  P(Q=1 | X, Z) is a non-trivial function of Z
  (b)  E(Y1 | X, Z) = E(Y1 | X)
 
u 0 σ 2 ρρ uvu ub
 (c)  ρb ~ N 0 , ub σ 2 ρbvb
ρv 0 uv ρbv 1
 
Apart from the parametric choice of the distribution of the unobservables implied by condition (CF.c) 
(in particular, joint normality and homoskedasticity), the control function model crucially relies on 
an exclusion restriction. Specifically, one needs an observable variable Z which is contained in W, i.e. 
which affects the decision to participate in the ERA study (the Q=1 decision – condition CF.a), but is 
not contained in X, i.e. does not affect potential ERA outcomes directly (condition CF.b). 
As discussed in Section A.1.1, condition (CF.a) and condition (CF.b) in terms of non-ERA outcomes Y0 
can be tested. Also, the parametric assumptions in (CF.c) can be relaxed (and thus tested), as shown 
in the next subsection.
Under the assumptions of the model, one can derive the exact form of the expected unobserved 
treatment outcome for each individual non-participant with a given set of characteristics W.
A convenient feature of the model is that since it provides estimates of ρuv and ρbv, it allows one 
to separately test for selection into the ERA study based on unobserved ‘ability’ (u) and based on 
unobserved individual-specific ERA impacts (b), evidence which can be of interest in its own right.
Exploiting administrative outcomes, one can construct two specification tests to assess – and order 
– the performance of the different control function models.
In particular, it is possible to construct a test for how well the control function model captures 
the actual extent of selection on unobservables between the participants (as represented by the 
controls) and the non-participants, that is, the parameter α estimated in the test outlined in Section 
A.1.1. The idea is to mathematically derive the expression for the control function model which is 
equivalent to α. Maybe unsurprisingly, this expression turns out to be closely related to the selection 
terms of the model. Given that the different control function models recover potentially different 
estimates of such selection terms, the difference between α and the selection terms provides a 
ready metric to ‘order’ the performance of these models.
The second specification test is based on testing how well a given control function model predicts 
the average no-treatment outcome for the non-participants. Once estimated, one can use the 
model to recover the predicted no-treatment outcomes for the non-participants, which can then be 
compared to the average observed no-treatment outcome for the non-participants.
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The analyst is, thus, in a position to choose between different specifications of the control function 
based on these two ‘metrics’, i.e. how closely a given model matches the difference in adjusted 
observed outcomes between the control group and the non-participants (reflecting the results 
from the test of selection on unobservables), as well as the average predicted and observed (no-
treatment) outcomes of the non-participants. 
A.1.3 Extensions to the standard control function model 
The standard model has been extended in two broad directions. 
First, the parametric assumptions on the unobservables have been relaxed in terms of both the 
independence and normality implied by condition (CF.c). Independence in particular was relaxed to 
allow for heteroskedasticity of the unobservable determinants of treatment and no-treatment outcomes 
(u and b), as well as for the covariances between the unobservables relating to outcomes (u and b) and 
the unobservable determinant of participation (v). The latter basically means that the selection process 
into the ERA study is allowed to be different for entrants with different observed characteristics. 
The second type of extension takes into account the censored nature of the outcome variable. In 
particular, the outcome is allowed to be censored (at zero in the case of employment duration or 
earnings) in both the treatment and no-treatment state.
As was the case with the other models, in addition to directly testing whether there was selection 
into the ERA study based on unobserved individual characteristics and/or unobserved gains from 
ERA, one can perform a number of ‘tests’ on the performance of the model. In particular, one can 
construct tests for how well the model captures the actual extent of selection on unobservables and 
for how well it predicts observed outcomes (i.e. no-treatment outcomes for the non-participants 
and the control group, and treatment outcomes for the programme group). Furthermore, the model 
is used to predict the average no-treatment outcome for the programme group and compare it 
to the observed average outcome of the control group, where, as we know, the latter provides an 
unbiased estimate of the former. The average effect for the participants using the extended model 
is estimated, and this estimate is then compared to the experimental one. 
All these specification tests are summarised as follows, together with the short-cut notation used in 
the results tables in the next section:
How well the model… Should be…
(α – selection terms) captures the actual extent of selection zero
Q=0: observed–predicted Y predicts (no-treatment) outcomes for 
non-participants 
zero
R=0: observed–predicted Y predicts (no-treatment) outcomes for the 
control group 
zero
R=1: observed–predicted Y predicts (treatment) outcomes for the 
programme group
zero
E(Y|R=0)–E(Y0|R=1) predicts no-treatment outcomes for the 
programme group
zero
ATE1…  predicts the average impact for 
participants
ATE1(experimental)
Finally note that the estimate of the average ERA impact for the eligible population uses the full 
model, taking observed outcomes for the programme group and predicted ERA outcomes for 
the controls and the non-participants on the one hand, and predicted non-ERA outcomes for the 
programme group and observed outcomes for the controls and the non-participants on the other.
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Appendix B 
District-level results
B.1 Experimental findings
Table B.1 Experimental findings for the ND25+ group during the  
 four-year follow up
Raw Adjusted N
Effect Std.Err. Effect Std.Err.
Ever employed 
All 0.027** 0.013 0.028** 0.012 6,006
Scotland 0.054 0.036 0.053 0.035 745
North East England 0.011 0.037 -0.005 0.035 703
North West England 0.021 0.027 0.028 0.025 1,377
Wales -0.034 0.047 -0.038 0.046 456
East Midlands 0.042 0.028 0.040 0.026 1,245
London 0.034 0.026 0.041* 0.024 1,480
Days employed  
All 24.6** 11.2 25.0** 10.6 6,006
Scotland 80.1** 31.6 73.9** 30.7 745
North East England 7.1 34.6 3.4 34.4 703
North West England 29.2 22.5 28.0 21.4 1,377
Wales -48.7 39.8 -45.3 39.6 456
East Midlands 38.0 25.9 32.5 24.9 1,245
London 12.0 21.6 17.0 20.4 1,480
Earnings (2008/09)
All 410** 199 392** 195 6,006
Scotland 1,662*** 537 1,508*** 540 745
North East England -85 721 11 720 703
North West England 258 372 182 369 1,377
Wales -285 527 -332 534 456
East Midlands 452 388 378 385 1,245
London 294 449 217 444 1,480
Earnings (2005–09)
All 1,894*** 702 1805*** 687 6,006
Scotland 4,472*** 1,639 3,817** 1,627 745
North East England 550 2,305 580 2,302 703
North West England 1,582 1,756 1,368 1,753 1,377
Wales -1,573 1,891 -2,255 1,949 456
East Midlands 2,970** 1,422 2,662* 1,406 1,245
London 1,585 1,324 1,372 1,291 1,480
Note: adjusted for the observables constructed from administrative data for the full sample.
Robust standard errors for ever employed.
70 Appendices – District-level results
Table B.2 Experimental findings for the NDLP group during the four-year  
 follow up
Raw Adjusted N
Effect Std.Err. Effect Std.Err.
Ever employed 
All -0.002 0.012 -0.008 0.011 5,052
Scotland -0.020 0.037 -0.014 0.038 413
North East England -0.021 0.027 -0.018 0.027 983
North West England 0.078*** 0.029 0.068** 0.028 759
Wales -0.051 0.033 -0.056* 0.032 514
East Midlands -0.013 0.026 -0.019 0.025 1,131
London -0.007 0.026 0.000 0.025 1,252
Days employed  
All 2.0 14.7 -4.0 13.9 5,052
Scotland 16.7 51.9 8.4 53.7 413
North East England -23.1 33.5 -15.7 32.3 983
North West England 101*** 36.6 70* 35.7 759
Wales -68.4 45.3 -97** 45.2 514
East Midlands -7.0 31.1 -11.3 30.0 1,131
London -8.8 30.0 -0.2 28.3 1,252
Earnings (2008/09)
All 21 230 -13 227 5,052
Scotland -1,308* 694 -1,583** 710 413
North East England 132 430 333 432 983
North West England 217 501 -115 503 759
Wales -243 535 -432 538 514
East Midlands 533 439 523 441 1,131
London -43 628 -189 631 1,252
Earnings (2005–09)
All 927 737 767 722 5,052
Scotland -12 2,026 -356 2,113 413
North East England 189 1,324 627 1,305 983
North West England 1,927 1,641 536 1,626 759
Wales 316 1,685 -362 1,648 514
East Midlands 1,612 1,434 1,630 1,429 1,131
London 1,000 2,041 588 2,042 1,252
Note: adjusted for the observables constructed from administrative data for the full sample.
Robust standard errors for ever employed.
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Summary Box B.1 Four-year experimental findings for the ATE1
ND25+ NDLP
Employment 
Positive effect on probability (2.8 ppts)
•	 Driven	by	London
No overall significant effect on probability
•	 Positive	impact	in	North	West	 
 England (6.8 ppts) 
•	 Negative	impact	in	Wales	(-5.6	ppts)
Positive effect on days (25 days)
•	 Driven	mainly	by	Scotland	(74	days)
•	 Negative	but	insignificant	impact	 
 in Wales
No overall significant effect on days
•	 Positive	impact	in	North	West	England 
 (70 days)
•	 Negative	impact	in	Wales	(-97	days)
Earnings 
Positive effect on earnings (£392 annually, 
£1,805 cumulatively)
•	 Driven	by	Scotland	(£1,508	annually, 
 £3,817 cumulatively) and East Midlands 
 (£2,662 cumulatively)
No significant effect on annual nor 
cumulative earnings
•	 Significant	negative	effect	in	 
 Scotland (-£1,583)
B.2 Bounds
Table B.3 Non-parametric bounds for the ATE – Outcome: ever employed  
 during the four-year follow up
p ATE1 ATE ATE
95% CI 
lower
95% CI 
upper N
ND25+
All 0.230 0.028** -0.081 0.148 -0.102 0.169 7,796
Scotland 0.087 0.053 0.011 0.098 -0.056 0.166 816
North East England 0.349 -0.005 -0.149 0.200 -0.202 0.252 1,080
North West England 0.146 0.028 -0.050 0.095 -0.096 0.141 1,612
Wales 0.207 -0.038 -0.126 0.081 -0.202 0.156 575
East Midlands 0.275 0.042 -0.105 0.170 -0.149 0.213 1,717
London 0.259 0.041* -0.074 0.185 -0.113 0.224 1,996
NDLP
All 0.304 -0.008 -0.227 0.077 -0.247 0.097 7,261
Scotland 0.053 -0.014 -0.065 -0.012 -0.134 0.057 436
North East England 0.292 -0.018 -0.240 0.052 -0.283 0.094 1,389
North West England 0.062 0.068*** 0.023 0.085 -0.030 0.138 809
Wales 0.236 -0.056* -0.226 0.010 -0.278 0.062 673
East Midlands 0.471 -0.019 -0.357 0.115 -0.390 0.148 2,140
London 0.310 -0.000 -0.220 0.090 -0.259 0.129 1,814
Note: Confidence intervals covering the identification region with 95 per cent probability have been derived 
from 1,000 bootstrap replications following Horowitz and Manski (2000).
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Figure B.1 ND25+: Sensitivity analysis: ATE0 for ever employed, Ө from 
 0.5 to 1.5
In black: experimental impact estimate and corresponding θ.
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Figure B.2 NDLP: Sensitivity analysis: ATE0 for ever employed, Ө from 0.5 to 1.5
In black: experimental impact estimate and corresponding θ.
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Summary Box B.2 Bounds and sensitivity analysis for ever employed during the 
   four-year follow up
ND25+ NDLP
Bounds Impact is positive in Scotland Impact is positive in NW England and small and negative in Wales
Sensitivity 
Overall: positive small under most 
scenarios 
Positive substantial in Scotland
Positive and small under most scenarios in 
NE England, NW England, E Midlands and 
London
Negative and small in Wales
Overall: sensitive 
Positive small in NW England 
Negative in Scotland and Wales
Mostly negative in London, E Midlands and 
NE England
B.3 Selection on observables 
Table B.4 Matching estimates for the ND25+ group during the  
 four-year follow-up
p ATE1 ATE0 ATE
ATE1 ≠ 
ATE0
ATE1 ≠ 
ATE0 N
All
Days employed 0.230 25.0** 62.5*** 33.6*** ***
4,831
Ever employed 0.230 0.028** 0.064*** 0.037*** ** **
Earnings 2008/09 0.230 392** 482* 413**
Earnings 2005–09 0.230 1,805** 2,392** 1,940***
Scotland
Days employed 0.087 73.9** 28.2 70.0
455
Ever employed 0.087 0.053 0.068 0.054
Earnings 2008/09 0.087 1,508*** -14 1,375
Earnings 2005–09 0.087 3,817** 1,634 3,627
North East England
Days employed 0.349 3.4 74.9 28.3 ** ***
737
Ever employed 0.349 -0.005 0.056 0.017
Earnings 2008/09 0.349 11 1,225 434 *
Earnings 2005–09 0.349 580 5,374 2,254 ** **
North West England
Days employed 0.146 28.0 2.5 24.3
932
Ever employed 0.146 0.028 -0.009 0.023
Earnings 2008/09 0.146 182 280 196
Earnings 2005–09 0.146 1,368 -534 1,090
Continued
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Table B.4 Continued
p ATE1 ATE0 ATE
ATE1 ≠ 
ATE0
ATE1 ≠ 
ATE0 N
Wales
Days employed 0.207 -45.3 27.5 -30.3
Ever employed 
Earnings 2008/09
0.207
0.207
-0.038
-331
0.034
297
-0.023
-201
344
Earnings 2005–09 0.207 -2,255 -618 -1,900
East Midlands
Days employed 0.275 32.5 91.7 48.7 ** **
Ever employed 
Earnings 2008/09
0.275
0.275
0.042
378
0.08
238
0.051
340
1,097
Earnings 2005–09 0.275 2,663* 2,217 2,540
London
Days employed 0.259 17.0 69.3 30.5 ** **
Ever employed 
Earnings 2008/09
0.259
0.259
0.041*
217
0.092
804
0.054
368
* *
1,266
Earnings 2005–09 0.259 1,372 3,412 1,899
ATE1 ≠ ATE and ATE1 ≠ ATE0 columns: bootstrap-based statistical significance of the difference.
Statistical significance based on bootstrapped bias-corrected confidence intervals (1000 replications): *** 
significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%.
Table B.5 Matching estimates for the NDLP group during the four-year  
 follow-up
p ATE1 ATE0 ATE
ATE1 ≠ 
ATE0
ATE1 ≠ 
ATE0 N
All
Days employed 0.304 -4.0 17.9 2.7
Ever employed 
Earnings 2008/09
0.304
0.304
-0.008
-13
0.020
691***
0.000
202
*
***
*
***
4,768
Earnings 2005–09 0.304 767 2,393*** 1,262** * *
Scotland
Days employed 0.053 8.4 184.1 17.6
Ever employed 
Earnings 2008/09
0.053
0.053
-0.014
-1,583**
0.003
2,214
-0.013
-1,400 * **
229
Earnings 2005–09 0.053 -356 8261 98 **
North East England
Days employed 0.292 -15.7 67.8 8.7
Ever employed 
Earnings 2008/09
0.292
0.292
-0.018
333
0.007
910
-0.011
502
915
Earnings 2005–09 0.292 627 3,449 1,452
Continued
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Table B.5 Continued
p ATE1 ATE0 ATE
ATE1 ≠ 
ATE0
ATE1 ≠ 
ATE0 N
North West England
Days employed 0.062 70.0* -111.0 58.3 ** **
452
Ever employed 0.062 0.068** 0.026 0.066
Earnings 2008/09 0.062 -115 -1,300 -186
Earnings 2005–09 0.062 536 -2900 325 * *
Wales
Days employed 0.236 -97** 45.8 -63.3 * *
419
Ever employed 0.236 -0.056* 0.039 -0.033 * *
Earnings 2008/09 0.236 -432 1,150 -58 ** **
Earnings 2005–09 0.236 -362 5,038 914 ** **
East Midlands
Days employed 0.471 -11.3 10.4 -1.1
1,576
Ever employed 0.471 -0.019 0.021 0.000
Earnings 2008/09 0.471 523 812 659
Earnings 2005–09 0.471 1,630 2,418 2,001
London
Days employed 0.310 -0.2 -0.9 -0.4
1,177
Ever employed 0.310 0.000 0.009 0.003
Earnings 2008/09 0.310 -189 818 123
Earnings 2005–09 0.310 588 2,992 1,332
ATE1 ≠ ATE and ATE1 ≠ ATE0 columns: bootstrap-based statistical significance of the difference.
Statistical significance based on bootstrapped bias-corrected confidence intervals (1,000 replications): *** 
significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%.
Summary Box B.3 Selection on observables
ND25+ NDLP
Employment 
better effect for Q=0 
•	 driven	by	NE	England,	East	Midlands	 
 and London 
ATE1 underestimates ATE for employment 
outcomes
better effect for Q=0 (but weak 
significance)
•	 driven	by	Wales
•	 except	in	NW	England	(better	effect	 
 for Q=1)
ATE1 representative of ATE for 
employment outcomes
Earnings 
Not significantly different effect for Q=0
•	 except	in	NE	England	(better	for	Q=0)
ATE1 representative of ATE for earnings 
outcomes
better effect for Q=0 
•	 driven	by	Wales	and	Scotland
•	 except	in	NW	England	(better	effect	 
 for Q=1)
ATE1 underestimates ATE for earnings 
outcomes
77Appendices – District-level results
B.4 Testing for selection on specific unobservables 
Table B.6 Differences in outcomes for participants (control group) compared to 
 non-participants with the same observed characteristics during the 
 four-year follow up: ND25+
OLS FILM Matching N
All
Days employed 50*** 34** 37***
4,755
Ever employed 0.042*** 0.026 0.033*
Earnings 2008/09 330 72 103
Earnings 2005–09 972 138 162
Scotland
Days employed 0.9 41.1 33.9
432
Ever employed 0.030 -0.022 0.034
Earnings 2008/09 -904 459 -984
Earnings 2005–09 -951 4,445 979
North East England
Days employed 95*** 89** 97***
720
Ever employed 0.079** 0.037 0.051
Earnings 2008/09 1,370** 1,559* 1,507**
Earnings 2005–09 5,060** 6,162*** 5,628**
North West England
Days employed -12.9 -21.0 -27.9
915
Ever employed -0.02 -0.007 -0.009
Earnings 2008/09 136 -137 37
Earnings 2005–09 -2,200 -3,800 -2,300
Wales
Days employed 121** 131** 136**
350
Ever employed 0.038 0.035 0.068
Earnings 2008/09 123 -798 -76
Earnings 2005–09 1,510 -1,900 1,115
East Midlands
Days employed 62** 56** 54*
1,092
Ever employed 0.057** 0.046 0.041
Earnings 2008/09 275 90 184
Earnings 2005–09 804 -122 335
London
Days employed 61*** 76*** 68***
1,246
Ever employed 0.050* 0.060** 0.054*
Earnings 2008/09 553 796 640
Earnings 2005–09 2,028 2,838* 2,629
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Table B.7 Differences in outcomes for participants (control group) compared  
 to non-participants with the same observed characteristics during 
 the four-year follow up: NDLP
OLS FILM Matching N
All
Days employed 35** 25.5 23.8
4,702
Ever employed 0.035*** 0.027* 0.031*
Earnings 2008/09 379 416 326
Earnings 2005–09 1,196 1,201 741
Scotland
Days employed 205* 261*** 289**
230
Ever employed -0.037 -0.007 0.145
Earnings 2008/09 1,952 6,658*** 3,977***
Earnings 2005–09 6,471* 22,000*** 11,000***
North East England
Days employed 59.812* 54.2 54.5
880
Ever employed 0.019 0.01 0.014
Earnings 2008/09 110 188 287
Earnings 2005–09 1,568 1,472 1,700
North West England
Days employed -188** -164** -300**
407
Ever employed -0.007 0.008 -0.07
Earnings 2008/09 -670 -768 -2,900*
Earnings 2005–09 -2,000 -2,600 -8,900*
Wales
Days employed 116** 150** 130*
413
Ever employed 0.117*** 0.141*** 0.142***
Earnings 2008/09 666 982 679
Earnings 2005–09 2,830 4,468** 3,722
East Midlands
Days employed 24.4 29.3 29.3
1,573
Ever employed 0.042* 0.044* 0.046*
Earnings 2008/09 184 275 250
Earnings 2005–09 634 758 696
London
Days employed -3.1 -8.3 -7.2
1,199
Ever employed 0.009 0.008 0.008
Earnings 2008/09 474 597 285
Earnings 2005–09 -67 -19 -728
Significance based on robust standard errors for OLS and FILM, and on approximate standard errors for kernel 
matching. ***: significant at 1%,**: at 5%, *: at 10%.
79Appendices – District-level results
Summary Box B.4 Selection on unobservables
ND25+ NDLP
All Worse employment outcomes (Lower earnings)
Worse employment outcomes
East Midlands Worse employment (Worse employment)
North East England Worse employment  Lower earnings No selection
Wales Worse employment Worse employment  Lower earnings
London Worse employment No selection
North West England No selection Better employment  (Higher earnings)
Scotland No selection Worse employment  Lower earnings
Note: in italics and brackets: weak evidence.
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Appendix C 
Matching diagnostics 
Table C.1 Estimation of the propensity score 
ND25+ NDLP
Scotland -0.256*** -0.383***
North East England 0.109*** -0.019
North West England -0.133*** -0.393***
Wales -0.081*** -0.128***
East Midlands 0.025 0.175***
2nd month of RA -0.080** -0.066
3rd month of RA -0.057 -0.045
4th month of RA -0.084** -0.075**
5th month of RA -0.084** -0.087**
6th month of RA -0.109*** -0.081**
7th month of RA -0.118*** -0.045
8th month of RA -0.129*** -0.062
9th month of RA -0.112*** -0.108***
10th month of RA -0.159*** -0.150***
11th month of RA -0.109*** -0.099***
12th month of RA -0.157*** -0.139***
13th month of RA -0.217***
Female -0.014 -0.002
Missing gender -0.064 -0.081
Age at inflow -0.027*** 0.005
Age squared 0.000*** -0.000
Missing age -0.361*** 0.068
Ethnic Minority 0.043** -0.016
Missing ethnicity 0.024 0.038
Has disability/claims IB at inflow 0.023 -0.008
Missing disability status 0.014
2 children, NDLP -0.006
≥3 children, NDLP -0.043*
Missing child info, NDLP 0.018
Youngest child <1 at inflow, NDLP -0.039
Youngest child 1-5 at inflow, NDLP 0.012
Age youngest child missing, NDLP -0.017
Has partner, ND25+ -0.025
Missing marital status, ND25+ -0.063*
Early entrant - ND25+ -0.036
Continued
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Table C.1 Continued
ND25+ NDLP
Not on benefits at inflow 0.102***
Employed at inflow 0.055* 0.150***
Show up same day 0.060* 0.061
Show up w/in 30 days -0.022 -0.083***
Past participation in basic skills 0.016 -0.025
Past participation in ND25+ program 0.027***
Past participation in voluntary programs -0.061*** 0.081***
Spent <50% of past 3 yrs on active benefits 0.003
Spent >50 & <100% of past 3 yrs on active benefits -0.005
Spent 0% of past 3 yrs on active benefits, NDLP -0.091
Spent >0 & <50% of past 3 yrs on active benefits -0.084
Spent 0% of past 3 yrs on inactive benefits -0.024 -0.047
Spent >0 & <50% of past 3 yrs on inactive benefits -0.001 0.003
Spent >50 & <100% of past 3 yrs on inactive 
benefits
-0.069 -0.032
Spent >0 & <25% of past 3 yrs in employment -0.025 -0.003
Spent ≥25% and <50% of past 3 yrs in employment -0.031 -0.020
Spent ≥50% of past 3 yrs in employment -0.093** -0.053**
Total ND caseload at office (100) -0.003 -0.006***
Share of LP in ND caseload at office 0.048 -0.065
Bottom quintile of local deprivation 0.048 -0.018
2nd quintile of local deprivation 0.034 0.062
3rd quintile of local deprivation 0.028 0.037
4th quintile of local deprivation 0.018 -0.025
TTWA-level unemployment rate 0.963 -1.472
Postcode missing or incorrect 0.493*** 0.001
Observations 4,829 4,766
Notes:	*	significant	at	10%;	**	significant	at	5%;	***	significant	at	1%
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Figure C.1 Common support between non-participants and programme group: 
 Distribution of P(Q=0 | Q=0  R=1, X)
Q=0 denotes non-participants, R=1 the programme group.
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Table C.2 Covariate balancing indicators before and after matching
 
Prob>chi Pseudo R2 Median bias Percentage 
lost to CS
Before After Before After Before After
ND25 
All 0.000 1.000 0.069 0.001 4.2 0.6 0.2
Scotland 0.005 1.000 0.170 0.011 13.8 2.7 4.3
North East England 0.000 1.000 0.102 0.006 7.8 1.3 4.2
North West England 0.013 1.000 0.064 0.004 5.6 1.0 1.3
Wales 0.000 1.000 0.189 0.030 10.8 3.4 5.0
East Midlands 0.004 1.000 0.048 0.004 4.2 1.5 0.4
London 0.000 1.000 0.061 0.002 4.5 1.3 1.0
NDLP 
All 0.000 1.000 0.121 0.001 3.8 0.8 0.2
Scotland 0.798 1.000 0.240 0.140 10.1 7.2 13.0
North East England 0.002 1.000 0.065 0.003 5.0 1.2 1.2
North West England 0.542 1.000 0.135 0.015 6.4 4.0 2.0
Wales 0.001 1.000 0.149 0.015 8.3 3.2 3.1
East Midlands 0.000 1.000 0.046 0.002 5.6 1.2 1.2
London 0.000 1.000 0.123 0.006 7.7 2.0 3.2
Notes:
Prob>chi: p-value of the likelihood-ratio test before (after) matching, testing the hypothesis that the regressors 
are jointly insignificant, i.e. well balanced in the two (matched) groups.
Pseudo R2: from probit estimation of the conditional probability of being a non-participant (before and after 
matching), giving an indication of how well the observables explain non-participation.
Median bias: median absolute standardised bias before and after matching, median taken over all the 
regressors. Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), for a given covariate, the standardised difference before 
matching is the difference of the sample means in the non-participant and participant subsamples as a 
percentage of the square root of the average of the sample variances in the two groups. The standardised 
difference after matching is the difference of the sample means in the matched non-participants (i.e. falling 
within the common support) and matched participant subsamples as a 3 of the square root of the average of 
the sample variances in the two original groups.
Percentage lost to CS: Share of the group of non-participants falling outside of the common support.
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Appendix D 
Power and validity of the 
instrument 
Table D.1 First stage of the instrument   
ND25+ NDLP
F- statistic p-value F- statistic p-value
Non-interacted linear model 11.8 0.001 19.0 0.000
Interacted non-linear model
• all Z terms 2.0 0.000 2.3 0.000
• Z, Z2, Z3 1.4 0.231 3.8 0.009
• XZ interactions 1.7 0.007 2.1 0.000
Sample size 7,796 7,261
Table D.2 Share of explained variance accounted for by the instrument in the 
 participation equation (full sample)
share p-value (Pseudo)-R2
ND25
logit 12.4 0.001 0.062
regression 14.0 0.001 0.065
NDLP
logit 5.8 0.000 0.111
regression 7.2 0.000 0.122
Note: Sample sizes: see Table D.1.
Table D.3 Testing part of the exclusion restriction   
ND25+ NDLP
F- test p-value F- test p-value
Earnings 2005/06 0.0 0.829 0.1 0.795
Earnings 2006/07 1.0 0.318 0.2 0.683
Earnings 2007/08 0.0 0.826 0.0 0.881
Earnings 2008/09 0.5 0.496 0.0 0.903
Cumulative earnings 0.1 0.802 0.1 0.807
Days employed (48m) 0.6 0.431 0.8 0.372
Ever employed (48m) 3.1 0.079 0.5 0.485
Note: Sample sizes: see Table D.1.
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